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ABSTRACT 
In February 2012, in a case called Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, 
the Texas Supreme Court held that landowners hold property rights to the 
groundwater beneath their land and that a regulatory restriction on 
groundwater use could constitute a taking of private property. The 
decision provoked strong reactions, both positive and negative, 
throughout the world of water law, for it signaled the possibility of severe 
restrictions on groundwater use regulation. 
This Article considers the deeper issue that confronted the Texas 
Supreme Court, and that has confronted other courts across the country: 
how should the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and parallel 
clauses of state constitutions, apply to groundwater use regulation? 
Initially, this Article explains why this issue is exceedingly and 
increasingly important. It then reviews all of the groundwater/takings 
decisions from federal and state courts in the United States. Finally, this 
Article considers the implications of foundational property theories for the 
application of takings doctrine to groundwater use. 
The analysis leads to several key conclusions. Most importantly, it 
undermines arguments for granting groundwater use rights and 
heightened protection against regulatory limitations. Recently, litigants 
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and commentators skeptical of government regulatory authority have 
widely advanced those arguments. But they find little support in past 
groundwater/takings case law, and no property theory justifies adopting 
such an approach. That does not mean that groundwater use rights should 
not qualify for constitutional protection. Despite some recent arguments to 
the contrary, such treatment is grounded in precedent and is entirely 
compatible with sensible groundwater management. This Article therefore 
concludes that the application of a relatively mainstream version of 
takings doctrine, which treats groundwater rights as property but allows 
substantial government regulation of groundwater use, is both the most 
traditional and the most theoretically justifiable approach. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Groundwater may be our most underappreciated natural resource.
1
 On 
an average day, 130 million Americans drink water from a well.
2
 In many 
 
 
 1. For a technical definition of groundwater, as well as an explanation of what it is and how it 
moves, see infra notes 46–57 and accompanying text. 
 2. See AM. GROUND WATER TRUST, PUB. INFO. PAMPHLET NO. 10: BACTERIA AND WATER 
WELLS, available at http://www.agwt.org/content/bacteria (last visited Dec. 19, 2013); NAT’L 
GROUNDWATER ASS’N, GROUNDWATER USE FOR AMERICA (2010), available at http://www.ngwa.org/ 
Documents/Awareness/usfactsheet.pdf (“43.8% of America’s population regularly depends upon 
groundwater for its drinking water supply.”) (footnote omitted). 
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rural areas, no other water source is available.
3
 Approximately 40,000 
municipal water supply systems depend upon groundwater, as does much 
of the bottled water industry.
4
 Nearly 100,000 American farms depend 
upon groundwater, which provides approximately forty-two percent of the 
nation’s irrigation supplies.5 In some places, groundwater is the 
predominant agricultural water source, and in many other areas it is the 
most reliable.
6
 Groundwater aquifers also recharge many of our surface 
waterways, and thus play a critical role in sustaining rivers, lakes, 
wetlands, and streams.
7
 We generally give groundwater very little thought. 
Because it is concealed from view, most people have only vague, and 
often inaccurate, conceptions of what groundwater is, where it comes 
from, and how it moves.
8
 But obscurity does not mean unimportance. 
Groundwater plays a central role in our daily lives. 
Groundwater also is a source of conflict. Its invisibility begets overuse, 
and across the nation, many aquifers
9
 are pumped at unsustainable rates.
10
 
Others have been effectively lost to pollution.
11
 Fears of groundwater 
contamination remain at the center of major public controversies over 
natural gas drilling, oil pipelines, and nuclear waste disposal.
12
 Globally, 
 
 
 3. According to the United States Geological Survey, “[a]n estimated 42.9 million people in the 
United States . . . supplied their own water for domestic use in 2005. . . . Nearly all (98 percent) of 
these self-supplied withdrawals were from fresh groundwater.” U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 
ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2005 19 (2009). 
 4. EPA, FACTOIDS: DRINKING WATER AND GROUND WATER STATISTICS FOR 2009 4 (2009). 
The exact number is 40,025, and those systems serve just over 88 million people. Id. 
 5. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 3, at 43; NAT’L GROUNDWATER ASS’N, supra 
note 2, at 1. The exact number, based on 2009 data, is 97,690 farms. Id. 
 6. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, HIGH PLAINS REGIONAL GROUND-WATER STUDY 3 (2000) 
(“Water from the High Plains aquifer is the principal source of supply for irrigated agriculture . . . .”); 
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the Commons, 30 ENVTL. 
L. 241, 249 n.45 (2000) (providing statistics on the importance of groundwater to rural areas). 
 7. See generally THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE 
RESOURCE (1998). 
 8. See Daniel L. Dickerson et al., Groundwater in Science Education, 18 J. SCI. TEACHER 
EDUC. 45, 46 (2007) (“[F]ew students or science educators hold complete and appropriate 
understandings regarding the concept and apparently do not learn anything about it after high 
school.”); see also DAVID KEITH TODD & LARRY W. MAYS, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 3–4 (3d ed. 
2005) (describing inaccurate theories that philosophers from Aristotle to Descartes offered to explain 
the origins of groundwater). 
 9. An aquifer is a subsurface formation through which groundwater flows, and from which it 
can be pumped at economically viable rates. See infra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (describing 
groundwater and aquifers in more detail). 
 10. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND-WATER DEPLETION ACROSS THE NATION (2003), 
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-103-03/. 
 11. See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (describing the terrible 
consequences of using water from a polluted aquifer). 
 12. See OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., EPA, PLAN TO STUDY THE POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF 
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON DRINKING WATER RESOURCES viii (2011) (“Many concerns about 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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aquifers are being depleted—that is, pumped at a rate greater than natural 
recharge—by an estimated 145 cubic kilometers per year, a rate high 
enough to measurably contribute to sea level rise.
13
 Such extensive 
groundwater use generates tensions among competing users, and it also 
carries environmental consequences, including reduced streamflows and 
degraded surface water quality.
14
 Sometimes groundwater pumping can 
literally make rivers disappear.
15
 
The resulting conflicts implicate basic questions of statutory, common, 
and constitutional law. In the United States, most human groundwater use 
occurs under some sort of claimed property right, with groundwater users 
claiming either ownership interests in the groundwater beneath their land 
or usufructuary rights
16
 to pump groundwater and put it to use.
17
 
Consequently, groundwater users often argue that they are protected from 
regulation by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
by similar provisions of state constitutional law.
18
 In recent litigation, they 
have ratcheted up the ambition of their arguments, claiming that 
groundwater use rights (or water use rights more generally) should receive 
more takings protection than courts traditionally provide to other forms of 
property.
19
 Yet the case for regulatory control of groundwater use seems 
compelling. Most aquifers span property boundaries, and one property 
owner’s pumping can compromise or even dry out her neighbors’ wells.20 
 
 
hydraulic fracturing center on potential risks to drinking water resources . . . .”); Paul Hammel, 
Pipeline Tweaks Don’t Tamp Skepticism, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Sept. 6, 2012, at 1B; David 
Applegate, The Mountain Matters, in UNCERTAINTY UNDERGROUND: YUCCA MOUNTAIN AND THE 
NATION’S HIGH-LEVEL NUCLEAR WASTE 105, 108–12 (Allison M. Macfarlane & Rodney C. Ewing 
eds., 2006) (describing the uncertain relationship between groundwater flow and the ability of a spent 
nuclear fuel repository to contain the waste). 
 13. See Leonard F. Konikow, Contribution of Global Groundwater Depletion Since 1900 to Sea-
Level Rise, 38 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 17401, 17401 (2011).  
 14. See, e.g., S. Zekster et al., Environmental Impacts of Groundwater Overdraft: Selected Case 
Studies in the Southwestern United States, 47 ENVTL. GEOLOGY 396 (2005); see generally WINTER ET 
AL., supra note 7. Of the many examples described by Zekster et al., the story of California’s 
Cosumnes River, which once was a major salmon stream, is particularly stark: “between 8 and 16 km 
of the Cosumnes River dry up towards the end of California’s dry season . . . . This decline is the result 
of groundwater extraction that has lengthened the period during which rivers in this region feature very 
low or negligible flow.” Zekster et al., supra, at 400. 
 15. See, e.g., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, EFFECTS OF WATER WITHDRAWALS ON STREAMFLOW 
IN THE IPSWICH RIVER BASIN, MASSACHUSETTS (2001), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs-160-
00/pdf/fs00160.pdf; ROBERT GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND THE FATE OF 
AMERICA’S FRESH WATERS 35–125 (2002) (describing multiple waterways at risk). 
 16. A usufruct is “[a] right for a certain period to use and enjoy the fruits of another’s property 
without damaging or diminishing it, but allowing for any natural deterioration in the property over 
time.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 177–82. 
 18. See infra Part II (describing cases involving such claims). 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 136–41 and 209–12. 
 20. See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/1
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That pumping also can strain ecological systems protected under a wide 
variety of environmental laws.
21
 Consequently, groundwater use routinely 
activates the tension between a widely shared desire to protect private 
property rights from regulation and an equally widely recognized need to 
use regulation to curb problematic uses of property.
22
 As many 
commentators have noted, resolving that tension forms one of the central 
challenges of American property and constitutional law.
23
 
The inchoate nature of groundwater law exacerbates these tensions. 
Most states’ groundwater laws evolved when unrestricted pumping was 
widely viewed as acceptable or even desirable, and when groundwater 
science was too undeveloped to support sophisticated regulatory 
schemes.
24
 Consequently, landowners generally could pump without any 
constraint from competing private users or from public regulators.
25
 On 
paper, at least, the law has evolved beyond its archaic roots. Almost every 
state has at some point produced legislation or judicial decisions, or both, 
proclaiming the importance of groundwater regulation.
26
 The on-the 
ground reality in many places, however, still resembles the pre-regulatory 
regime, with uneven coverage, sparse monitoring, and little enforcement.
27
 
Efforts to resolve the tensions between property rights and environmental 
protection, and among competing property users, therefore remain in their 
nascent stages, and groundwater management offers a window into the 
 
 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 107 (1990) (“Water underlying any parcel of land . . . can be siphoned to a 
neighbor’s land . . . .”). 
 21. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 250 (discussing ecological consequences of groundwater 
pumping); Todd H. Votteler, The Little Fish That Roared: The Endangered Species Act, State 
Groundwater Law, and Private Property Rights Collide Over the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 28 ENVTL. 
L. 845 (1998). 
 22. See, e.g., Votteler, supra note 21 (describing how Texas’ Edwards Aquifer became a key 
battleground in this conflict). 
 23. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984) (describing this question as “[b]y far the most intractable constitutional 
property issue”). 
 24. See BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 444–45 (5th ed. 2012); Antonio Rossmann & Michael J. Steel, Forging the New Water 
Law: Public Regulation of “Proprietary” Groundwater Rights, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 903, 906–07 (1982). 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 93–103. 
 26. For example, while Texas holds a reputation as one of the laggards of groundwater law, its 
courts have endorsed groundwater regulation, and the state legislature has empowered groundwater 
management districts to exercise regulatory authority. See, e.g., Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground 
Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618, 633 (Tex. 1996) (endorsing a legislative role in water use 
regulation).  
 27. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional Conjunctive 
Management, 47 IDAHO L. REV. 273, 274 (2011) (noting the prevalence of “lax legal rules and poor 
enforcement”); infra text accompanying notes 112–18. 
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application of the Fifth Amendment to a still-underdeveloped fringe of 
property law.
28
 
This Article addresses how our legal systems are, and should be, 
responding to that challenge. In so doing, it offers three contributions to 
the existing legal literature. First, this Article provides the first 
comprehensive analysis of past groundwater/takings cases, as well as the 
first guide for courts considering such cases in the future. Second, that 
analysis advances a broader debate over the application of takings doctrine 
to water rights generally. That broader debate has received substantial 
attention, but commentators have focused almost exclusively on the law of 
surface water.
29
 An inquiry into groundwater disputes can therefore shed 
new light on an old, but still heated, debate. Third, all of this discussion 
supports an argument directly relevant to litigation now working its way 
through the courts. That argument, in brief, is that neither judicial 
precedent nor legal theory provides any basis for granting groundwater use 
rights, or water rights more generally, special favoritism under the takings 
clause.
30
 
This Article begins by explaining what groundwater is, how 
groundwater law has evolved, and why groundwater management 
continues to generate lawsuits. In Part II, I explore how the judicial system 
has responded to those challenges. The analysis begins in Texas, where a 
recent decision brought national attention to the intersection of 
 
 
 28. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 6, at 252–53 (discussing the tendency toward belated and 
partial responses to groundwater overuse); Joseph L. Sax, We Don’t Do Groundwater: A Morsel of 
California Legal History, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 269, 270 (2003) (“[California] groundwater is 
effectively unregulated.”). 
 29. See, e.g., John D. Leshy, A Conversation about Takings and Water Rights, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1985 (2005); Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
1 (2002); Melinda Harm Benson, The Tulare Case: Water Rights, the Endangered Species Act, and the 
Fifth Amendment, 32 ENVTL. L. 551 (2002); Joseph L. Sax, The Constitution, Property Rights and the 
Future of Water Law, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 257 (1990); Josh Patashnik, Note, Physical Takings, 
Regulatory Takings, and Water Rights, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 365 (2011). 
The last few years have produced a few law review articles specifically focused on the Texas 
controversies. See Gerald Torres, Liquid Assets: Groundwater in Texas, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 143 
(2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/12/4/torres.html; Deborah Clarke Trejo, Identifying and 
Valuing Groundwater Withdrawal Rights in the Context of Takings Claims—A Texas Case Study, 23 
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 409 (2010); Gregory S. Friend, Note, The Quick of the Matter: The Proposition of 
Takings Litigation under the Save Our Springs Ordinance, 25 VT. L. REV. 545 (2001); Ashlie 
Newman, Note, Edwards Aquifer v. Day and the Future of Groundwater Regulation in Texas, 31 REV. 
LITIG. 403 (2012). 
 30. One contribution this Article does not endeavor to offer is a detailed exploration of the ways 
different groundwater law doctrines should influence takings analyses. While those questions are 
interesting, the core argument here implies that they should not be crucially important. Under multiple 
systems of groundwater law, and in periods of flux between systems, courts have allowed regulatory 
constraints while rarely finding takings, and I argue that those traditions are appropriate. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/1
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groundwater law and takings doctrine.
31
 But takings cases involving 
groundwater are not new, and Part II therefore addresses the full set of 
published groundwater/takings decisions produced by American courts. It 
shows that American courts have traditionally treated groundwater rights 
as property rights subject to constitutional protection, but also have almost 
always allowed government to regulate groundwater use without paying 
compensation.
32
 These conclusions undermine two dueling theories 
arguing that water rights should either be categorically excluded from, or 
categorically favored within, takings analyses.
33
 What approach is 
normatively desirable is another question, but the groundwater cases 
provide powerful evidence that neither categorical approach has been a 
significant part of our water law tradition. Courts instead have favored a 
combination of property rights and deference to regulation.
34
  
Part III turns to those normative questions. Although case law at the 
intersection of groundwater regulation and takings doctrine may seem 
somewhat settled, the partial consensus is fragile. In part, that fragility 
arises from a thin theoretical basis; the courts’ conclusions rarely provide a 
deeper analysis of the relationship between groundwater regulation, 
takings doctrine, and property theory. If they do provide that deeper 
discussion, the reasoning is sometimes at odds with strands of the 
Supreme Court’s more recent takings jurisprudence.35 That leaves the 
decisions vulnerable to theoretical attacks, which libertarian-leaning 
judges, legislators, and property theorists are quite ready to supply, and 
which have gained at least moments of traction in other analogous 
contexts.
36
 Part III therefore considers the implications of foundational 
 
 
 31. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012). For a more recent, and 
potentially even more controversial, decision, see Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-
CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013). 
 32. The recent Bragg decision is a significant exception to that tradition. 
 33. For arguments that water right restrictions should be subject to a categorical physical takings 
analysis, see Patashnik, supra note 29, at 404–15; Scott Andrew Shepard, The Unbearable Cost of 
Skipping the Check: Property Rights, Takings Compensation & Ecological Protection in the Western 
Water Law Context, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1063, 1111–14 (2009). For diametrically opposed 
arguments, except for the shared premise that water rights merit exceptional treatment, see, e.g., 
Sandra B. Zellmer & Jessica Harder, Unbundling Property in Water, 59 ALA. L. REV. 679, 687 (2008) 
(“[A]ppropriators do not have full takings property.”); Shelley Ross Saxer, The Fluid Nature of 
Property Rights in Water, 21 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 49, 50 (2010) (“[W]ater is too unlike land to 
be subject to private property holdings.”).  
 34. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 29, at 260 (“The constitutional law of water is the same as the 
constitutional law of potatoes and pork chops.”). 
 35. See infra text accompanying notes 219–25. 
 36. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN (1985); Shepard, supra note 33; Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 
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property theories for the intersection of groundwater regulation and 
takings doctrine. My conclusion, in a nutshell, is that the courts have been 
getting things largely right, even if their explanations have often been 
sparse. Treating groundwater rights as property is consistent with, though 
perhaps not mandated by, our traditional approaches to property rights. 
And no property theory justifies subjecting groundwater regulations to 
heightened judicial scrutiny. 
I. THE CHALLENGE OF GROUNDWATER LAW 
Central Texas contains what might be the nation’s highest-profile 
aquifer.
37
 The Edwards Aquifer irrigates thousands of acres of crops and 
serves as the primary water supply for approximately 2.1 million people.
38
 
The aquifer also supports a unique set of ecosystems, some of which 
contain threatened and endangered species.
39
 Use of Edwards Aquifer 
water is subject to a complex statutory and regulatory regime, which the 
Texas Legislature initiated in response to litigation brought under the 
Federal Endangered Species Act.
40
 That litigation in return responded to 
unsustainable levels of groundwater use, which were depleting the aquifer 
and threatening the surface and subsurface ecosystems dependent upon 
it.
41
 The Edwards Aquifer Authority, a regional administrative agency, 
now implements that regulatory scheme.
42
 But it must do so against the 
backdrop of a common law groundwater regime that purports to allow 
unlimited pumping so long as water remains physically available, and 
amid a political culture characterized by skepticism of regulation.
43
 One 
 
 
Fed. Cl. 313, 324 (2001) (holding that regulatory water use restrictions are compensable as physical 
takings). 
 37. The other candidate for this oxymoronic distinction would be the Ogallala Aquifer, which 
underlies significant parts of Texas, Oklahoma, Kansas, and Nebraska. See C.W. FETTER, APPLIED 
HYDROGEOLOGY 263 (4th ed. 2001). 
 38. EDWARDS AQUIFER AUTH., HYDROLOGIC DATA REPORT FOR 2010 3 (2011), available at 
http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/documents/2011_Hamilton-etal_2010HydrologicData.pdf; see also Todd 
H. Votteler, Raiders of the Lost Aquifer? Or, the Beginning of the End to Fifty Years of Conflict over 
the Texas Edwards Aquifer, 15 TULANE ENVTL. L.J. 257, 258–72 (2002) (describing the aquifer). 
 39. Votteler, supra note 38, at 271; see also Votteler, supra note 21, at 851. 
 40. See Votteler, supra note 21, at 856–60 (describing the genesis of the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority Act). 
 41. Id.; see also Zekster et al., supra note 14, at 398. 
 42. See Edwards Aquifer Authority, available at http://www.edwardsaquifer.org/index.php (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
 43. See Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999) (declining to 
depart from the “rule of capture,” a common law doctrine that allows landowners to pump without 
limit from beneath their lands); David M. Konisky, Regulator Attitudes and the Environmental Race to 
the Bottom Argument, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 321, 327 (2007) (noting that environmental 
managers perceive Texas to be one of the states with the weakest environmental enforcement efforts). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/1
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frequent result, particularly in the last several years, has been takings 
litigation.
44
 
The Edwards Aquifer battles exemplify a broader struggle over 
groundwater regulation. This section describes how and why those 
conflicts come about. I begin with a groundwater primer, explaining where 
groundwater comes from, why it is economically and ecologically 
valuable, and how it can be so difficult to manage.
45
 I then turn to the legal 
systems governing groundwater management and explain why they often 
generate uncertainty and conflicting expectations—or, in other words, why 
they create fertile ground for takings cases. Finally, I turn to the recent 
evolution of takings doctrine and water rights, and explain why 
persistent—albeit overstated—ambiguities about the application of takings 
doctrine to water rights regulation heighten the potential for legal claims. 
The basic point is that the Edwards Aquifer battles both continue an 
established conflict and foreshadow the future. 
A. The Contested Resource 
At some point in our education, almost all of us have learned about the 
water cycle.
46
 We are taught how water evaporates from the ocean, 
precipitates over the land, and flows through streams and rivers back to the 
ocean, supporting human and ecological systems along the way.
47
 What 
many people do not realize is that much of that cycle happens 
underground. Particularly in undeveloped landscapes, most precipitation 
evaporates, is transpired by plants, or infiltrates through the ground 
surface; only a small percentage travels to surface waterways as overland 
flow.
48
 Water that infiltrates the surface then percolates downward until it 
hits the water table, which is the level below which all of the pore space
49
 
 
 
 44. See, e.g., Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-06-CV-1129-XR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
23380 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2008); Coates v. Hall, 512 F. Supp. 2d 770 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Edwards 
Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., 71 S.W.3d 729 
(Tex. 2002); Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 
1996); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 
28, 2013). 
 45. For a more detailed groundwater primer, see THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 448–63. 
 46. See UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, THE WATER CYCLE FOR KIDS, available at 
http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/watercycle-kids.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 47. See id. 
 48. See COMM. ON REDUCING STORMWATER DISCHARGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WATER 
POLLUTION, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, URBAN STORMWATER MGMT. IN THE UNITED STATES 156 
(2009). 
 49. “Pore space” is the space between particles of silt, sand, gravel, or rock. See THOMPSON ET 
AL., supra note 24, at 449. 
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in the soil or rock is saturated with water.
50
 Below the water table, 
groundwater tends to flow laterally, and much of that water will eventually 
discharge into surface waterways.
51
 The rates of flow may be very slow—
hydrogeologists would consider a meter per day to be a relatively fast flow 
rate—and water passing through clay or non-porous rock may barely 
move at all.
52
 A saturated and relatively permeable subsurface layer 
through which water moves more quickly, and from which it can readily 
be pumped, is commonly referred to as an “aquifer.”53 
Aquifers contain a surprising percentage of freshwater resources. 
Globally, most freshwater is frozen in glaciers and icecaps.
54
 Of the 
remaining freshwater, ninety-eight percent is beneath the ground.
55
 Some 
of that groundwater is far below the surface, and therefore is difficult for 
humans to access and plays little role in sustaining surface water 
ecosystems.
56
 But even at near-surface levels, the aggregate quantity of 
groundwater in many areas greatly exceeds the quantity in surface lakes, 
rivers, and streams.
57
 
Beyond sheer abundance, several other characteristics make 
groundwater resources highly valuable to people. In many regions—
particularly arid or semi-arid ones—groundwater is more geographically 
dispersed than surface water.
58
 Consequently, while a farmer might need 
extensive pipes or irrigation ditches—as well as complex legal 
arrangements—to convey water from the nearest stream to her land, she 
can extract groundwater, with relatively minimal capital investments, from 
directly beneath her fields.
59
 Groundwater’s slow flow and evaporation 
rates also make it more steadily available.
60
 Surface streams typically run 
 
 
 50. See FETTER, supra note 37, at 4–5, 37–42. 
 51. See id. at 5. Some of that water will evaporate and become moisture in the unsaturated 
vadose zone, and, depending upon the depth of groundwater, some will be absorbed by plants’ roots. 
Id. 
 52. See id. at 85 (providing hydraulic conductivity ranges for a variety of subsurface materials); 
see also id. at 95 (describing “confining layers,” which are geologic formations that retard water flow). 
 53. Id. at 95 (“An aquifer is a geologic unit that can store and transmit water at rates fast enough 
to supply reasonable amounts to wells.”) (emphasis removed). 
 54. Id. at 4. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 445 (“In some areas, physically available 
groundwater is so far below the surface that it is not cost-effective to pay for the pump ‘lift’ to the 
surface.”). 
 57. A classic example is the Ogallala Aquifer, which lies beneath much of the High Plains, an 
area where surface streams are relatively rare. See FETTER, supra note 37, at 263. 
 58. See TODD & MAYS, supra note 8, at 15 (“The storage capacity of groundwater reservoirs 
combined with small flow rates provide large, extensively distributed sources of water supply.”). 
 59. See Mark Giordano, Global Groundwater? Issues and Solutions, 34 ANN. REV. ENVTL. RES. 
153, 155 (2009). 
 60. See FETTER, supra note 37, at 446 (“There are no evaporative losses from ground-water 
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low during summer and early fall, which are precisely the times when 
municipal and agricultural water demands tend to peak. Groundwater 
levels, however, remain relatively steady, unless an aquifer is being 
pumped faster that its rate of recharge.
61
 Finally, groundwater is often 
cleaner than surface water. Surface waterways generally receive a 
significant portion of their inflows from stormwater runoff, which, as the 
Supreme Court recently noted, “is often heavily polluted.”62 Particularly 
during warm seasons, surface waterways also can become highly fecund 
breeding grounds for algae, bacteria, and other biological toxins.
63
 
Groundwater is vulnerable to human contamination, and it is by no means 
biologically inert.
64
 But the level of pollution in groundwater, even in 
relatively urbanized areas, is often much lower than in adjacent surface 
water bodies.
65
 
As a consequence, groundwater use is extensive. In 2005, according to 
the United States Geological Survey, the United States used approximately 
82.6 billion gallons of groundwater per day.
66
 Most of that groundwater 
supports irrigated agriculture, but municipal and industrial suppliers, 
mining operations, and even aquaculture businesses are also widely 
dependent upon groundwater, as is a multi-million dollar bottled water 
industry.
67
 In some states—Florida is the most populous example—
groundwater withdrawals exceed surface water withdrawals.
68
 Aggregate 
groundwater use in the United States may actually be declining, and per 
capita groundwater use clearly is; the 2005 totals were five percent lower 
than those from 2000, when the United States’ groundwater use hit an all-
time peak.
69
 But the overall numbers remain immense. 
While the physical nature of groundwater presents certain advantages 
for human users, it also creates challenges. Perhaps the largest challenge is 
 
 
storage . . . .”).  
 61. See Giordano, supra note 59, at 155.  
 62. L.A. Cnty. Flood Control Dist. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 133 S. Ct. 710, 712 (2013); see 
Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 
441–42 (2011) (discussing sources of stormwater pollution). 
 63. See EPA, Cyanobacterial Harmful Algal Blooms (CyanoHABs), available at www2.epa.gov/ 
nutrient-policy-data/cyanobacterial-harmful-algal-blooms-cyanohabs (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 64. See Thompson, supra note 27, at 289 (noting recent literature describing ecosystems within 
aquifers). 
 65. See Giordano, supra note 59, at 155. 
 66. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 3, at 6. 
 67. See NAT’L GROUNDWATER ASS’N, supra note 2 (stating that the bottled water industry used 
5.34 billion gallons of groundwater in 2001). 
 68. See generally U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 3 (providing groundwater use 
statistics). 
 69. Id. at 43–44. 
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that aquifers typically span property boundaries, and groundwater moves 
in response to pumping.
70
 Consequently, wells on one property, if pumped 
vigorously enough, can suck in water from adjacent lands, lowering the 
water table beneath those lands in the process.
71
 If the drawdown is 
sufficiently large, wells will eventually run dry. The same problem can 
occur on a regional or even international scale, with one set of 
groundwater users’ aggressive pumping interfering with others’ ability to 
access the resource.
72
 Managing any shared resource is generally easier if 
each user’s consumption is easily monitored, but groundwater use can be 
difficult to track.
73
 Unless one watches the sprinklers very closely, or 
unless users are subject to mandatory reporting requirements, it is hard to 
tell how much water your neighbor is using.
74
 Subsurface groundwater 
flow also can be hard to measure, and determining the extent of 
interference among competing users can be difficult.
75
 Groundwater 
therefore represents a classic example of a common-pool resource, with 
limited monitoring capacity exacerbating all the widely identified 
challenges associated with managing such commons.
76
  
To complicate matters further, groundwater also plays a critical 
ecological role. Some of the groundwater that infiltrates into the 
subsurface never re-enters the surficial portion of the water cycle. But 
many shallow aquifers discharge water into wetlands, streams, and lakes, 
as well as providing sustenance to riparian vegetation alongside surface 
waterways.
77
 That groundwater recharge tends to be steadier, cleaner, and 
less prone to temperature extremes than surface water inflows.
78
 It 
therefore helps maintain streamflows and lake levels between rain events; 
 
 
 70. See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 107. For a detailed discussion of the effects of groundwater 
pumping, see TODD & MAYS, supra note 8, at 152–98. 
 71. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 454. 
 72. See, e.g., FETTER, supra note 37, at 267 (showing declining water levels in the Ogallala 
Aquifer); MARQ DE VILLIERS, WATER: THE FATE OF OUR MOST PRECIOUS RESOURCE 200–03 (2000) 
(describing the role of aquifer depletion in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict). 
 73. See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 94–100 (explaining the importance of monitoring for 
management of common-pool resources). 
 74. See Carol M. Rose, From H2O to CO2: Lessons of Water Rights for Carbon Trading, 50 
ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 99 (2008) (“Groundwater is invisible and elusive, and because it is relatively easy to 
tap from a great variety of locations, its use is hard to monitor.”). See also M. RHEAD ENION, UNDER 
WATER: MONITORING AND REGULATING GROUNDWATER IN CALIFORNIA 9–12 (2011) (noting that 
California lacks any statewide system for monitoring groundwater use).  
 75. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 458–63 (describing informational challenges). 
 76. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 250 (“[G]roundwater is also a natural commons.”); id. at 245 
(explaining how “opacity of user behavior” makes common pool resources more difficult to manage). 
 77. See generally WINTER ET AL., supra note 7 (explaining interconnections between surface 
water and groundwater). 
 78. See Owen, supra note 62, at 441–42 (discussing stormwater pollution); FETTER, supra note 
37, at 446 (describing how water quality can improve as water passes through the subsurface). 
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keeps temperatures within a range in which fish and other aquatic species 
can survive; dilutes pollution carried into surface waters by stormwater 
flows; and sustains riparian habitats.
79
 Without groundwater, many of our 
waterways would be ecologically impoverished, and some would cease to 
be waterways at all.
80
  
The ecological importance of groundwater opens up another front for 
potential conflict. Across the nation, examples abound of surface 
waterways drawn down, or even entirely dried out, by groundwater 
pumping.
81
 The Edwards Aquifer provides a particularly salient example 
of the problem. There, pumping has lowered water levels in several major 
springs, placing human recreation and endangered species at risk.
82
 Similar 
conflicts have arisen even in relatively well-watered places like 
northwestern California, where groundwater pumping along the Scott 
River—an important salmon stream—has generated ongoing litigation,83 
and eastern Massachusetts, where groundwater pumping helped dry out 
the Ipswich River and led to a series of legal battles.
84
 These examples 
represent just the tip of an iceberg, and the iceberg may be growing. 
Because groundwater moves relatively slowly, there can be a significant 
time lag between the onset of pumping and the first evidence of ecological 
impact.
85
 But those delayed impacts will eventually arrive, and with so 
many aquifers being overdrafted, present pumping practices are sowing 
the seeds for additional future conflicts.  
As with conflicts among competing consumptive users, these 
ecological conflicts are not easy to resolve. To some extent, the problems 
are similar: monitoring challenges complicate efforts to determine when 
overall pumping levels are problematic and whose individual pumping is 
causing the problem.
86
 Ecological problems also often result from the 
cumulative impact of many different wells, rather than from just a few 
 
 
 79. See Masaki Hayashi & Donald O. Rosenberry, Effects of Ground Water Exchange on the 
Hydrology and Ecology of Surface Water, 40 GROUND WATER 309 (2002). 
 80. See GLENNON, supra note 15, at 35–50 (describing the former Santa Cruz River). 
 81. See generally id. (providing multiple case studies of groundwater overuse). 
 82. See id. at 92. 
 83. See John Bowman, Karuk Study Results Released, SISKIYOUDAILY.COM (July 1, 2012, 10:33 
AM), http://www.siskiyoudaily.com/article/20120604/NEWS/306049993/0/SEARCH (updating 
description of Karuk Tribe Report on the Scott River controversy). 
 84. See GLENNON, supra note 15, at 99–111. 
 85. Marios Sophocleous, Groundwater Recharge and Sustainability in the High Plains Aquifer in 
Kansas, USA 13 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 351, 354 (2005) (“[T]he current apparent health of an exploited 
aquifer and the ecosystems that depend upon it does not necessarily indicate that the situation will be 
sustainable in the longer term . . . .”). 
 86. See generally THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 458–63 (discussing informational 
challenges). 
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discrete sources. In whatever context it arises, that sort of cumulative 
environmental problem is often quite difficult for regulators to resolve.
87
 
Finally, the combination of groundwater’s relative invisibility and the time 
lags between pumping and its ecological consequences all increase the 
temptation to pump now and worry about the consequences later.
88
 Quite 
often, that is exactly what we have done.
89
 
B. Evolving and Uncertain Groundwater Law 
The presence of a common-pool resource subject to diverse and 
competing demands clearly creates a legal challenge, but it need not 
generate takings claims. Some common-pool resources are managed 
without much legal conflict, or with the legal battles fought on other 
fronts.
90
 Takings claims tend to arise where resource users can claim 
property interests in the contested resource and where the law governing 
the resource is transitioning toward more extensive regulatory control.
91
 
With groundwater, all of those conditions are present. In the legal systems 
of the United States, groundwater rights are widely understood as property 
rights.
92
 And states’ systems of common-law rights, while often 
ill-defined, frequently purport to allow extensive or even, in a few 
instances, nearly unlimited pumping, which places them in uncertain 
tension with emerging regulatory controls.
93
 
These uncertainties and tensions have their historic roots in a mix of 
scientific misunderstanding, informational limitations, and laissez-faire 
common law.
94
 For centuries, groundwater science, to the extent it existed, 
 
 
 87. See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Climate Change, Dead Zones, and Massive Problems in the 
Administrative State: A Guide for Whittling Away, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 59, 64–65 (2010) (summarizing 
the challenges of responding to such problems). 
 88. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 255–65 (explaining why common-pool resources are often 
poorly managed in contexts of uncertainty). 
 89. See generally GLENNON, supra note 15 (providing examples of groundwater overuse). 
 90. See generally OSTROM, supra note 20 (providing case studies of successfully managed 
common-pool resources). 
 91. See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2003). 
Perhaps the best example of such a transition involves wetlands, which once were widely viewed as 
nuisances that landowners could destroy at will and now are widely viewed as ecologically important 
and worthy of regulatory protection—and which often generate takings cases. See, e.g., Just v. 
Marinette Cnty., 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972) (discussing this shift). 
 92. See infra text accompanying notes 177–82. 
 93. See infra text accompanying notes 112–18. 
 94. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860 105 
(1977) (attributing the pro-development orientation of groundwater law to its emergence at a time 
when “laissez-faire assumptions firmly took hold of the imaginations of American judges”).  
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was founded upon colorful misconceptions.
95
 Those misconceptions 
largely precluded states from developing private—or public—law systems 
for limiting overall consumption or for dividing aquifers into shares for 
competing users, and well into the nineteenth century, groundwater law 
represented a near-anarchic exception to the otherwise well-developed 
property regimes of the day. The traditional approach was perhaps best 
expressed in Frazier v. Brown, an 1861 Ohio Supreme Court decision that 
rejected any legal constraint on groundwater pumping.
96
 The Frazier court 
offered two justifications for its rule. First: 
[b]ecause the existence, origin, movement and course of such 
waters, and the causes which govern and direct their movements, 
are so secret, occult and concealed . . . an attempt to administer any 
set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless 
uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible.
97
 
Second, the court asserted that a rule protecting downstream 
landowners would inappropriately interfere with industrial progress.
98
 
Frazier’s “dark arts” holding, as one subsequent decision characterized 
it,
99
 illustrates two principles that for years dominated groundwater law. 
The first is a principle of non-constraint. Frazier’s “absolute dominion” 
rule essentially allowed unrestrained pumping, encouraging aggressive 
groundwater use not only without public regulatory constraint, but also 
with hardly any possibility of a check under private common law.
100
 The 
second principle is a legal divide between groundwater and surface waters. 
 
 
 95. See TODD & MAYS, supra note 8, at 3–4 (describing groundwater theories, many wildly 
inaccurate, from Homer, Aristotle, Descartes, and other luminaries). In general, early thinkers believed 
groundwater moved in highly unpredictable and mysterious ways, and that attempting to regulate it 
therefore would be futile. Id. 
 96. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 15 
Ohio St. 3d 384, 387 (1984). Frazier was not the first Anglo-American decision to so hold. See, e.g., 
Acton v. Blundell, 12 Mees. & Wels. 324, 349–54 (Ex. 1843). It was, however, perhaps the most 
colorful in its chosen language. 
 97. Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 311. 
 98. Id. (“[A]ny such recognition of correlative rights, would interfere, to the material detriment 
of the common wealth, with drainage and agriculture, mining, the construction of highways and 
railroads, with sanitary regulations, building and the general progress of improvement in works of 
embellishment and utility.”). 
 99. McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 646 (Ohio 2005). 
 100. See Frazier, 12 Ohio St. at 300, 311–12 (rejecting the possibility of even a private law claim 
against a competing groundwater user). For these reasons, some lawyers have argued that traditional 
groundwater law created no property rights at all, at least until the water was actually brought to the 
surface, for users lacked any control of the resource and could not exclude other competing users. This 
argument seems sensible, but courts in absolute dominion states have not yet been persuaded. See infra 
text accompanying notes 178–82.  
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By the nineteenth century, no court would have alleged that rivers moved 
in secret, occult ways, and the legal systems for allocating surface water 
were relatively sophisticated.
101
 But even as scientists became increasingly 
cognizant of the close relationship between ground and surface water 
systems,
102
 the legal system continued to insist that groundwater and 
surface water were separate, with the complex laws applicable to the latter 
unnecessary to the former.
103
 
On paper, the primacy of these principles now is substantially 
diminished. The changes have occurred in several ways. First, absolute 
dominion remains the law of only a few states, and even those states now 
also have statutory and administrative laws that purport to regulate 
groundwater use.
104
 Many states have moved toward common law systems 
that entitle each groundwater user only to a reasonable share of 
groundwater use, or toward prior appropriation systems, with groundwater 
rights allocated on a first-come, first-served basis.
105
 Second, some states 
also now have, on paper at least, some integration between their systems 
of groundwater and surface water rights.
106
 In prior appropriation states,
107
 
for example, later-developed groundwater rights are generally subordinate 
to previously established surface rights, and surface users can sometimes 
enjoin groundwater pumping.
108
 Third, in many states, management 
authority over groundwater is moving toward administrative agencies and 
 
 
 101. By the early nineteenth century, American surface water law was sufficiently extensive to 
merit its own treatise. See JOSEPH K. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES (7th ed. 
1877) (1825). 
 102. See T.N. Narasimhan, Hydrogeology in North America: Past and Future, 13 
HYDROGEOLOGY J. 7, 8 (2005) (describing the discovery of groundwater/surface water interactions). 
 103. See GLENNON, supra note 15, at 30. The sole exception to this general rule applied to 
groundwater flowing in known and definite channels. See, e.g., N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water 
Res. Control Bd., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 823 (2006) (quoting Cal. Water Code § 1200 (West 2009)). 
States generally treat such water as part of the surface water system. See, e.g., id. at 824. But 
discerning what groundwater meets that definition is not easy. Indeed, although I studied 
hydrogeology as an undergraduate and then worked as an environmental geologist, I never even heard 
the phrase “known and definite channels” before coming to law school. 
 104. Compare, e.g., Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 153 (Me. 1999) (“We decline to abandon 
the absolute dominion rule.”) with An Act Concerning the Sustainable Use of and Planning for Water 
Resources, ch. 399, 2007 Me. Laws 975 (creating a permit process for new “significant groundwater 
wells” in Maine). Similarly, Texas’s continued adherence to the rule of capture is balanced by 
legislation allowing the creation of groundwater management districts. See TEX. WATER CODE ANN. 
§ 36.116(a)(2) (West 2011) (authorizing groundwater management districts to regulate pumping). 
 105. See Maddocks, 728 A.2d at 153 (“Most jurisdictions have adopted the reasonable use, or 
American, rule or some variation of it.”) (footnote omitted). 
 106. See, e.g., Kobobel v. Dep’t of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127, 1135 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) 
(describing Colorado’s integration of groundwater and surface water law). 
 107. Prior appropriation doctrine, which is the dominant legal system for water rights in the West, 
allocates water rights on a first-come, first-served basis. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 167–
376. 
 108. See, e.g., Kobobel, 249 P.3d at 1136–38. 
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away from the courts.
109
 Fourth and finally, the 1970s brought the 
emergence of a broad superstructure of federal and state environmental 
laws.
110
 While none of those laws directly targeted groundwater use, some 
could compel restraint where groundwater pumping was causing 
environmental degradation.
111
 
Nevertheless, vestiges of the former era still permeate groundwater 
law. A few states still do adhere to the absolute dominion rule.
112
 While 
legislatures in those states also have created administrative regulatory 
systems, their courts have not yet decided how to reconcile those 
administrative constraints with a common law regime that takes 
libertarianism to an extreme.
113
 And while most states have empowered 
administrative agencies to manage groundwater, their management 
schemes are riddled with exemptions, and many groundwater users remain 
almost completely unregulated.
114
 Some states also have not given their 
administrative agencies enough funding and support to prescribe limits on 
 
 
 109. Both Texas and Maine have statutes that exemplify this trend. See supra text accompanying 
note 104. The Texas and Maine statutes both lodge authority in administrative agencies. See also 
GARY C. BRYNER & ELIZABETH PURCELL, GROUNDWATER LAW SOURCEBOOK OF THE WESTERN 
UNITED STATES (2003) (describing groundwater management in western states; almost all rely on 
statewide or local administrative agencies, and some use both). 
 110. See generally RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004) 
(describing environmental law’s emergence and evolution). For an extended saga involving the 
application of state environmental law to groundwater use, see Rossmann & Steel, supra note 24, at 
91–25 (describing groundwater litigation in California’s Owens Valley). 
 111. See, e.g., GLENNON, supra note 15, at 92–93 (describing the role of Endangered Species Act 
litigation in Edwards Aquifer management). 
 112. See Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 153 (Me. 1999) (“We decline to abandon the absolute 
dominion rule.”); Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of Am., Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75, 75 (Tex. 1999); see also 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dana Corp., 759 N.E.2d 1049, 1055 & n.5 (Ind. 2001). See generally A. DAN 
TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES § 4:6 (2012) (“The absolute ownership rule is 
still followed in some eastern states and in Texas. Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, and Rhode Island 
still purport to follow the absolute ownership rule . . . .”) (footnotes omitted). 
 113. This basic question was raised, though not resolved, in Texas’s Day litigation. In Maine, it 
has not yet come up. Other states have purported to address the issue, though not with a detailed legal 
analysis. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co., 759 N.E.2d at 1055 & n.5 (affirming the absolute dominion rule 
while also noting “that the legislature has placed further restraints on the use of groundwater . . . . [W]e 
do not view [these constraints] as having altered the common law property status of ground water.”). 
 114. California is the most notorious example of a weak administrative system, but regulatory 
systems in several other states, including New York and West Virginia, are similarly minimal. See 
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE WATER WITHDRAWAL REGULATIONS, available 
at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/env-res/state-water-withdrawal-regulations.aspx (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2013) (“California does not have a comprehensive permit process for regulation of 
groundwater use.”). The NCIS summary page also lists several states, including Alabama, Arkansas, 
Illinois, Louisiana, Missouri, and Tennessee, that require reporting but not permitting of groundwater 
use. Id. Almost all states exempt some users—usually small or medium users; sometimes also 
agricultural users—from registration and permitting requirements, or only apply their requirements to 
portions of the state. See id. 
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use, monitor compliance with these limits, and bring enforcement actions 
against violators.
115
 In theory, private litigation under common law 
theories might fill that gap, at least outside of absolute dominion states. 
But in reality, potential plaintiffs face daunting evidentiary challenges that 
can effectively preclude litigation. To prevail, they must demonstrate not 
only that they have been injured, but also by whom, and then must show 
that the competing users’ groundwater withdrawals exceeded their 
reasonable shares.
116
 Between the complexities of aquifer hydrogeology, 
the typical absence of information on groundwater withdrawals, and the 
inherent vagueness of common law standards, those showings can be 
difficult to make, and plaintiffs may not even try.
117
 Finally, while some 
states have attempted to fully integrate groundwater and surface water 
regimes, others are still attempting to manage two resources as though 
interconnections do not exist.
118
  
This fitful and uneven process of legal evolution creates conditions 
conducive to two types of takings claims. First, when legislatures or courts 
do attempt to reform groundwater laws—for example, by shifting from an 
absolute dominion standard to a permit-based system of administrative 
regulation—the changes necessarily involve altering an established system 
of property rights. Such shifts can easily generate takings claims, for many 
property owners believe their rights are immune to such political shifts.
119
 
Second, even when regulators apply existing law to particular groundwater 
users—perhaps by denying a permit to drill a well, or to pump it at the 
applicant’s desired level—they still may interfere with landowners’ 
 
 
 115. See CHARLES J. TAYLOR & WILLIAM M. ALLEY, GROUND-WATER-LEVEL MONITORING AND 
THE IMPORTANCE OF LONG-TERM WATER-LEVEL DATA 2 (2001) (“[W]ater-level monitoring in the 
United States is fragmented and largely subject to the vagaries of existing local projects.”); Thompson, 
supra note 27 (describing the prevalence of lax enforcement). 
 116. See Michael P. Mallery, Groundwater: A Call for a Comprehensive Management Program, 
14 PAC. L.J. 1279, 1290 (1983) (noting chronic uncertainty over the scope of groundwater use rights in 
non-adjudicated basins). 
 117. As an attorney representing groundwater users in California’s Central Valley, I faced these 
challenges. Some may become surmountable in a general adjudication for an entire groundwater basin, 
but general adjudications are costly and time-consuming, and sometimes are not legally possible. See, 
e.g., Wright v. Goleta Water Dist., 219 Cal. Rptr. 740, 748–50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) (declining to allow 
a general groundwater adjudication in the absence of a statutory authorization); THOMPSON ET AL., 
supra note 24, at 490 n.37 (compiling sources that cite cost and time as deterrents to general 
adjudications). 
 118. See BRYNER & PURCELL, supra note 109, at 7, 14 (noting the absence of integration in 
California and Arizona). 
 119. See Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) (“[A] State, by 
ipse dixit, may not transform private property into public property without compensation . . . .”); see 
also Doremus, supra note 91, at 3. 
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expectations.
120
 Those expectations may be difficult to reconcile with the 
paper existence of common-law and regulatory limitations on groundwater 
use, but they may be quite consistent with historic practices.
121
 That 
consistency then can easily create a sense, at least on the part of the 
landowner, that an established property right is being taken.  
C. The Takings Doctrine Overlay 
A final complicating ingredient in this recipe for takings claims is a set 
of uncertainties within takings doctrine itself. Takings doctrine remains 
contested territory, and in recent years, water rights litigation has become 
a major new front in that contest.
122
 The doctrine is not entirely unsettled; 
indeed, some commentators have argued that existing takings case law is 
actually becoming more ordered and consistent.
123
 Nevertheless, a 
competition among widely disparate conceptions of takings doctrine still 
continues, and that competition creates additional uncertainty about the 
relationship between takings doctrine and groundwater use regulation. 
Despite the common characterizations of takings law as muddled,
124
 the 
United States Supreme Court has seemed, at least at times, to be moving 
toward a relatively stable conception of takings doctrine. Under the 
standard approach, categorical takings tests, under which plaintiffs have a 
relatively high likelihood of prevailing, apply to physical invasions and 
direct appropriations of property and to complete wipeouts of value, even 
 
 
 120. See, e.g., Cross-Appellants’ Brief at 5-15, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 2013 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 04-11-00018-CV) (describing the conflict between the Bragg’s 
expectation that they would have sufficient water to irrigate their pecan orchards and the regulatory 
restrictions imposed by the Edwards Aquifer Authority). 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 112–18 (noting the prevalence of gaps and 
non-enforcement in groundwater management regimes). 
 122. See, e.g., Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (evaluating a 
takings claim based on denial of grazing permit and alleged loss of access to water); Casitas Mun. 
Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (evaluating takings claim based on 
species protection measures); Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 328 (2005) (same); 
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001) (same); see also Robin 
Kundis Craig, Defining Riparian Rights as “Property” through Takings Litigation: Is there a Property 
Right to Environmental Quality?, 42 ENVTL. L. 115, 125–44 (2012) (describing takings cases 
involving water rights). 
 123. See, e.g., Mark Fenster, The Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings, 28 STAN. ENVTL. 
L.J. 525, 527 (2009) (stating that Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005), brought some 
measure of peace, though not complete coherence, to takings doctrine); Robert Meltz, Takings Law 
Today: A Primer for the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 307, 370 (2007) (“Close analysis reveals that 
contemporary courts issue more or less predictable rulings in several areas of takings law.”).  
 124. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 23; Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078–97 (1993); 
Doremus, supra note 91, at 1.  
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if those wipeouts were caused solely by regulatory constraints.
125
 All 
regulatory constraints that do not cause complete wipeouts are reviewed 
under the ad hoc analytical standard set forth in Penn Central 
Transportation Company v. New York City.
126
 The Penn Central analysis 
is traditionally much friendlier to government defendants.
127
 Wide 
agreement also exists on the deeper purposes of takings doctrine. One 
purpose, in the Supreme Court’s oft-repeated words, is to “bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens 
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”128 But a competing purpose is to assure that government has some 
power to regulate property use, for “‘government regulation—by 
definition—involves the adjustment of rights for the public good,’ . . . 
[and] ‘[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident 
to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change 
in the general law.’”129 These tests and principles contain their ambiguities 
and internal tensions, but, at least as constitutional tests go, they do 
provide courts with enough guidance to render modern takings law a 
moderately predictable field.
130
 
Nevertheless, the seemingly settled doctrine remains subject to a 
fundamental challenge, one that would substantially restrict the 
government’s regulatory capacity. Over thirty years ago, Richard Epstein 
argued for a radically different version of takings doctrine, under which 
nearly any regulation that effectively transfers wealth would create 
government liability.
131
 The United States Supreme Court has never 
overtly adopted this approach in its entirety, but some of the Justices’ 
opinions, particularly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, suggested 
sympathy for this view.
132
 Though less prevalent in recent decisions, such 
 
 
 125. See Meltz, supra note 123, at 329, 360–62. 
 126. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Penn Central involved a takings challenge to New York City’s 
landmark law, which the city had used to prevent Penn Central from building into the airspace above 
Grand Central Station. The Court rejected the challenge, and it articulated a three-part standard for 
evaluating regulatory takings claims: courts should consider “economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant”; the extent of interference “with distinct investment-backed expectations”; and “the 
character of the governmental action.” Id. at 124. 
 127. See F. Patrick Hubbard et al., Do Owners Have a Fair Chance of Prevailing under the Ad 
Hoc Regulatory Takings Test of Penn Central Transportation Company?, 14 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
F. 121, 141 (2003) (providing statistics showing that landowners usually lose Penn Central claims). 
 128. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
 129. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538 (2005) (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 
51, 65 (1979) and Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922)). 
 130. See Meltz, supra note 123, at 370 (describing “more or less predictable rulings”). 
 131. EPSTEIN, supra note 36. 
 132. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Tahoe’s Requiem: The Death of the Scalian View of Property and 
Justice, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 727, 731–32 (2004) (describing the influence of this view on a series of 
Supreme Court cases in the 1990s). 
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signs of sympathy continue to appear, most prominently in the Court’s 
2010 decision in Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection.
133
 Writing for a conservative 
plurality, Justice Scalia dismissed the possibility that states, either through 
judicial or legislative action, might “[allow] for incremental modifications 
to property law,” and seemed to suggest that any such modification would 
constitute a taking.
134
 No Court majority has ever gone that far, but that 
notion continues to influence litigants’ positions. Perhaps even more 
importantly, similar notions provide the foundations for legislative takings 
initiatives and ballot measures across the country.
135
 
One focal point of the property rights campaign has been the field of 
water rights, where litigants and some commentators have opined that 
courts should make much more extensive use of categorical takings 
tests.
136
 Their campaign found its first major success twelve years ago. In 
Tulare Lake Water Basin Storage District v. United States,
137
 the United 
States Court of Federal Claims determined that environmental restrictions 
on surface water use were compensable under a categorical physical 
takings analysis.
138
 The primary reasons, according to the court, were: 
(1) because water rights are usufructuary, any use restriction effectively 
eviscerates the right; and (2) to a plaintiff, it made little difference whether 
the restraint followed from a regulatory constraint or from the government 
physically removing the water; the impact was the same.
139
 Both reasons, 
if more widely adopted, would set water rights takings doctrine far apart 
 
 
 133. 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010). 
 134. Id. at 2606 (responding to, and quoting, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence); see J. Peter Byrne, 
Stop the Stop the Beach Plurality!, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619, 619–20, 627 (2011) (describing and 
critiquing this view). 
 135. See Hannah Jacobs, Note, Searching for Balance in the Aftermath of the 2006 Takings 
Initiatives, 116 YALE L.J. 1518, 1520 (2007) (“This movement . . . seeks to extend current Fifth 
Amendment takings doctrine to give property owners a claim to compensation whenever government 
regulation causes even slight decreases in the value of their property.”). 
 136. See Shepard, supra note 33; Patashnik, supra note 29; Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 
42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 129–32 (Ct. App. 2006) (considering, and rejecting, an argument that a 
restriction on water use constituted a physical taking); Cross-Appellants’ Brief at 45-50, Edwards 
Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 04-11-00018-CV) 
(arguing that restrictions on groundwater use should be analyzed as physical takings). 
 137. 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001). Tulare Lake involved a challenge by agricultural interests in 
California’s Central Valley to water use restrictions designed to protect two fish species that had been 
listed under the Federal Endangered Species Act. Id. 
 138. Id. at 318–20; 324. 
 139. See id. at 319 (“In the context of water rights, a mere restriction on use—the hallmark of a 
regulatory action—completely eviscerates the right itself since plaintiffs’ sole entitlement is to the use 
of the water.”); id. at 320 (“[W]hether the government decreased the water to which plaintiffs had 
access by means of a dam or by means of pumping restrictions amounts to a distinction without a 
difference.”). 
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from traditional takings doctrine.
140
 Twelve years later, the Tulare Lake 
decision stands almost entirely alone, save for one Federal Circuit decision 
involving some peculiar facts.
141
 Criticism has been widespread; the 
Tulare Lake case itself lacks precedential value (and was later repudiated, 
albeit anemically, by the judge who wrote it
142
); and many more cases 
have rejected its analytical methodology than have followed it.
143
 But the 
idea that water rights should be subject to a more plaintiff-friendly mode 
of takings analysis still continues to find moments of traction.
144
 Adding to 
the potential uncertainty is conspicuous judicial silence. It has been fifty 
years since any takings case involving water allocation emerged from the 
United States Supreme Court.
145
 
The push for heightened protection of consumptive water use rights 
also has inspired (and may partly be inspired by) countermovements. In 
articles and amicus briefs, advocates favoring greater government 
oversight over water resources have pressed very different versions of the 
law of water rights and takings. Under the most prevalent view, 
government should have broad discretion to regulate water use, and 
plaintiffs should hardly ever be able to prove a taking when a regulation 
restricts water use. That approach, according to its proponents, follows 
 
 
 140. See Benson, supra note 29, at 584–86 (explaining how the Tulare Lake case’s 
effect-on-the-plaintiff reasoning diverges from traditional takings analysis). In its land use cases, the 
Court has never suggested that use rights should enjoy higher status than ownership rights. 
 141. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (also holding 
that a use restriction should be analyzed as a potential physical taking). Casitas involved a requirement 
that the plaintiffs take water out of their diversion ditch and redirect it to the river, and this fact seems 
to have been centrally important to the court’s decision. See id. at 1290–93. The court did not endorse 
a more general principle that all regulatory restrictions on water use should be analyzed as physical 
takings. See id. The Federal Circuit later dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff did not hold a 
property right to the water it claimed had been taken. Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 142. See Casitas Mun. Water District v. United States, 76 Fed. Cl. 100, 106 (2007), rev’d, 543 
F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 143. See, e.g., CRV Enters., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1247–48 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(declining to use a physical takings analysis); Washoe Cnty. v. United States, 319 F.3d 1320, 1326–27 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (also declining to use a physical takings analysis); Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of 
Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 132 (Ct. App. 2006) (“[W]e disagree with Tulare Lake’s conclusion 
that the government’s imposition of pumping restrictions is no different than an actual physical 
diversion of water.”). For sample academic critiques of the Tulare Lake decision, see Benson, supra 
note 29; Gray, supra note 29. 
 144. See, e.g., Patashnik, supra note 29, at 404–15; Shepard, supra note 33. See also Craig, supra 
note 122, at 122 (“[I]f the core property right at issue is the right to use . . . any interference with that 
right to use begins to look more akin to a physical taking.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 145. The Court has been actively involved in takings cases involving water resources. See, e.g., 
Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511 (2012) (considering a takings claim 
arising from temporary but repeated flooding); Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of 
Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592 (2010) (considering takings claims involving littoral rights). But the last 
Supreme Court case to directly address a takings issue involving water allocation was Dugan v. Rank, 
372 U.S. 609 (1963). 
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from basic principles of water law.
146
 They argue that water rights are 
inherently more limited and contingent than ownership interests in land or 
personal property, and that private use rights must coexist with, and often 
remain subordinate to, overriding public interests in waterways.
147
 
Consequently, to an even greater extent than land use rights, water use 
always remains subject to governmental oversight and control.
148
 A 
smaller group of advocates would take this sort of argument several steps 
further, and claim that water rights lack key attributes of more traditional 
property rights and therefore are not constitutional property at all.
149
 
The clash among these competing views has profound implications for 
takings cases involving groundwater regulation. If the Stop the Beach 
Renourishment plurality view becomes the law of the land, and state 
courts and legislatures effectively lose the ability to revise and update state 
property law, groundwater law will remain with one foot firmly cemented 
in the nineteenth century. The gradual movement toward increasing 
regulatory oversight could largely cease.
150
 Similarly, the adoption of a 
categorical takings test—or even a less-than-categorical test that still 
involves heightened scrutiny of government actions—for groundwater 
rights restrictions would severely restrict the application of legal 
constraints, either existing or new, to groundwater use.
151
 Either 
development would represent a boon to the traditional approach of 
unrestrained pumping, and a substantial burden to more modern legal 
approaches predicated upon regulatory balancing and constraint. 
Conversely, if courts decide that groundwater rights do not qualify as 
property, takings protection for groundwater use rights would diminish. 
Whether that would substantially change the level of restrictions on 
private users is not an easy question to answer; while such an outcome 
 
 
 146. See generally Gray, supra note 29 (arguing that the nature of water rights makes takings 
claims less viable than in a land-use context); Leshy, supra note 29 (same). 
 147. See, e.g., Gray, supra note 29, at 4. That view does find ample support in surface water case 
law. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 509 (1945) (quoting United 
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 69 (1913) (“[T]hat the running water in a 
great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.”)); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. 
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (holding that private surface water rights are inherently 
limited by state public trust authority). 
 148. See generally Gray, supra note 29; Leshy, supra note 29. 
 149. See, e.g., Zellmer & Harder, supra note 33. 
 150. See JOHN D. ECHEVERRIA, GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW & POLICY INST., PROPERTY VALUES 
AND OREGON MEASURE 37: EXPOSING THE FALSE PREMISE OF REGULATION’S HARM TO 
LANDOWNERS 5 (2007), available at http://www.vermontlaw.edu/Documents/102009propertyValues 
AndOregonMeasure37.pdf (finding a pronounced tendency to waive or avoid regulations rather than 
pay compensation). 
 151. See id. 
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seems intuitively plausible, other countries that lack takings protection for 
water users still are often quite solicitous of private water use.
152
 But at the 
very least, that shift would diminish the prevalence of takings claims.
153
 
Finally, if an intermediate position prevails, takings protection would 
remain available in rare instances, but almost all instances of groundwater 
use regulation would not lead to compensation requirements. 
II. GROUNDWATER, TAKINGS, AND THE COURTS 
In 1994, R. Burrell Day and Joel McDaniel bought 381.4 acres of 
agricultural land in Texas.
154
 The Edwards Aquifer lies beneath their 
property, and Day and McDaniel hoped to tap the aquifer to irrigate oats, 
peanuts, and pastures.
155
 However, to continue to use water from their one 
well, which was partially defunct, or to replace it with a new one, they 
needed authorization from the Edwards Aquifer Authority.
156
 They applied 
for, and received, authorization for pumping, but they did not get nearly as 
much water as they wanted. The Edwards Aquifer Authority’s permitting 
scheme favors users who were pumping prior to implementation of the 
Edwards Aquifer Authority Act, and Day and McDaniel did not fit into 
that category.
157
 Consequently, their permit came with what they viewed 
as severe restrictions on the amount of groundwater they could pump.
158
 
Day and McDaniel sued, alleging a taking.
159
 The litigation has not yet 
produced a final judgment. But in a February 2012 decision, the Texas 
Supreme Court concluded that Day and McDaniel have property rights in 
the water beneath their land, even prior to pumping, and that a regulatory 
scheme that limits the exercise of those rights could effect a taking.
160
 
Many property rights advocates and rural water users celebrated the 
 
 
 152. For example, New Zealand does not provide takings protection to water users, but the 
absence of such protection has not prevented aggressive industrial and agricultural exploitation of New 
Zealand’s waterways. See WATER PROGRAMME OF ACTION INTER-DEPARTMENTAL WORKING GRP., 
N.Z. MINISTRY OF ENV’T, FRESHWATER FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 12–14 
(2004) (describing New Zealand’s system of “resource consents,” which permit water use without 
creating ownership rights, as well as the demands placed upon New Zealand’s waterways). 
 153. They probably would not disappear, for plaintiffs still could argue that restrictions on 
groundwater use effectively took their land. See, e.g., Pratt Constr. Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 76 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (raising such a claim). 
 154. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. 2012).  
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 818–19. 
 157. Id. at 818–21 (“With few exceptions, water may not be withdrawn from the aquifer through 
wells drilled after June 1, 1993.”) (footnote omitted). 
 158. Id. at 820–21. 
 159. Id. at 821. 
 160. Id. at 843 (“[A] landowner cannot be deprived of all beneficial use of the groundwater below 
his property merely because he did not use it during an historical period and supply is limited.”). 
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decision as a landmark victory, while environmentalists and government 
water managers warned of a grave threat to sustainable groundwater 
use.
161
  
Day is probably the nation’s most prominent groundwater/takings case, 
and it already has begun to receive academic attention.
162
 But it is not the 
only one. Over the past century, state and federal courts have decided at 
least
163
 fifty cases involving alleged takings of groundwater.
164
 This 
 
 
 161. See, e.g., Mose Buchele, What the State Supreme Court Ruling on Water Rights Means for 
Texas, STATEIMPACT (Feb. 24, 2012, 3:01 PM), http://stateimpact.npr.org/texas/2012/02/24/what-
does-the-supreme-court-ruling-on-water-rights-mean/; Bruce Wright, A Victory for Property Rights: 
Texas Court Decision Affirms Right to Water, FISCAL NOTES (May 7, 2012), http://www.window 
.state.tx.us/comptrol/fnotes/fn1204/water-rights.php; Gabriel Eckstein, Texas Water Flowing Above 
Ground is Public but Below It’s Private, STAR-TELEGRAM (Mar. 10, 2012), http://www.star-
telegram.com (archives access requires password) (“[T]he court has effectively undermined and 
jeopardized the state’s ability to respond to water shortages and plan for its future.”). 
 162. See Torres, supra note 29. The case already has begun appearing in water law casebooks. 
See, e.g., THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 498–505. 
 163. This number includes only decisions available on Lexis or Westlaw’s databases. Because not 
every case produces a decision, and because not every decision is published on Lexis and Westlaw, the 
total number of cases is probably higher. Nevertheless, a search of popular media databases did not 
reveal any additional cases. 
 164. See Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693 (6th Cir. 2009); Washoe Cnty. v. United 
States, 319 F.3d 1320 (Fed Cir. 2003); Sierra Nevada SW Enters. v. King, No. 3:10-CV-579-RCJ-
RAM, 2011 WL 3204737 (D. Nev. July 27, 2011); Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., No. SA-06-CV-
1129-XR, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23380 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 25, 2008); Coates v. Hall, 512 F. Supp. 2d 
770 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Williamson v. Guadalupe Cnty. Groundwater Conservation Dist., 343 F. Supp. 
2d 580, 598–99 (W.D. Tex. 2004); Knaust v. City of Kingston, 193 F. Supp. 2d 536 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1122–24 (D. Nev. 1989), aff’d on other grounds, Fallini v. Hodel, 
963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992); Cherry v. Steiner, 543 F. Supp. 1270, 1277–78 (D. Ariz. 1982); Walker 
v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 685, 706–07 (2008); Fallini v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 53 (1994), 
judgment vacated and remanded by Fallini v. United States, 56 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Jensen v. 
United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 583 (1989); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila 
River Sys. and Source, 9 P.3d 1069, 1083 (Ariz. 2000); Town of Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 
P.2d 1324, 1326–30 (Ariz. 1981); Town of Chino Valley v. State Land Dep’t, 580 P.2d 704, 705–07 
(Ariz. 1978); Sw. Eng’g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764, 768–70 (Ariz. 1955); Aikins v. Ariz. Dep’t of 
Water Res., 743 P.2d 946, 951 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987); Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct. App. 2006); Acosta v. Big Bear Cmty. Servs. Dist., 2004 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 
2253 (Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2004); Kobobel v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 1127 (Colo. 2011) 
(en banc); Cent. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Simpson, 877 P.2d 335, 347–48 (Colo. 1994); Vill. 
of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., 371 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1979); In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 
P.3d 409, 492–95 (Haw. 2000); City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm’n, 30 Haw. 912, 
916–17 (1929); Natural Res. Comm’n of Ind. v. AMAX Coal Co., 638 N.E.2d 418, 429 (Ind. 1994); F. 
Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164 (Kan. 1981); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 
578 (Kan. 1962); Md. Aggregates Ass’n v. State, 655 A.2d 886, 899-900 (Md. 1995); City of Gaylord 
v. Maple Manor Invs., L.L.C., No. 266954, 2006 WL 2270494 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006); Jones v. 
East Lansing-Meridian Water & Sewer Auth., 296 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Crookston 
Cattle Co. v. Minn. Dep’t of Natural Res., 300 N.W.2d 769, 774–75 (Minn. 1980); Bamford v. Upper 
Republican Natural Res. Dist., 512 N.W.2d 642, 651–52 (Neb. 1994); In re Town of Nottingham, 904 
A.2d 582 (N.H. 2006); Bounds v. State, 252 P.3d 708 (N.M. Ct. App. 2010), aff’d on other grounds by 
Bounds v. State ex rel. D’Antonio, 306 P.3d 457 (N.M. 2013); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 
(N.D. 1968); McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d. 640 (Ohio 2005); Smith v. Summit Cnty., 
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section reviews those cases.
165
 It begins by providing a general description 
of the case law, focusing on when and where the cases have arisen and 
what sort of claims they involve. It then turns to an analysis of reasoning 
and outcomes. That discussion supports several important conclusions, 
each of which sheds light on ongoing debates about the proper application 
of takings doctrine to groundwater, and on larger discussions about the 
implications of takings doctrine for water rights. 
A. The Increasing Frequency of Groundwater/Takings Cases 
Groundwater/takings litigation is a growing phenomenon. Over the 
past sixty years, every decade has brought at least as many published 
groundwater/takings decisions as the decade before. The current decade is 
on pace to continue that trend. The overall numbers remain modest—fifty 
cases is by no means an avalanche of litigation—but with increasing stress 
on water resources and continued emphasis on property rights litigation, 
there is little reason to expect the growth to cease.   
 
 
721 N.E.2d 482 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998); State ex. rel. Hensley v. City of Columbus, No. 10AP-840, 
2011 WL 2586353 (Ohio Ct. App. June 30, 2011); Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842 
(Okla. 2006); Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711 (S.D. 1964); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 
369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012); Barshop v. Medina Cnty. Underground Water Conservation Dist., 925 
S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Horton, No. 04-09-00375-CV, 2010 Tex. 
App. LEXIS 736 (Feb. 3, 1010); Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730 (Utah 2010); Weber 
Basin Water Conservancy Dist. v. Gailey, 328 P.2d 175 (Utah 1958); Peterson v. Dep’t of Ecology, 
596 P.2d 285 (Wash. 1979); Bostco LLC v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 835 N.W.2d 160 (Wis. 
2013); Lesaffre Yeast Corp. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 662 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. Ct. App. 
2003) (unpublished). 
 165. The list of cases comes with a few additional caveats. First, I included cases where plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin some government action because it allegedly would cause a taking as well as cases 
where plaintiffs sought damages for alleged takings. Second, the boundaries of the set are not all crisp. 
In some older cases, courts mixed takings and due process arguments, and the cases’ status as 
groundwater/takings decisions is ambiguous. See, e.g., F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 
1164, 1167, 1174 (Kan. 1981) (describing a complaint grounded exclusively in the equal protection 
provision of the Kansas Constitution, but ruling for the government defendant because “[t]he statute 
does not effect an unconstitutional taking of property”). More recent cases sometimes are ambiguous 
about whether the case concerns an alleged taking of groundwater use rights or whether groundwater 
regulation or protection was just a factor contributing to actions that allegedly took land use or surface 
water rights. See, e.g., Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730 (Utah 2010) (rejecting a claim 
alleging a taking of surface water and land use rights but premised on the diversion of groundwater 
from beneath the plaintiffs’ land); Charles A. Pratt Constr. Co. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (denying a takings claim based on land use restrictions partially motivated 
by the unavailability of groundwater). For that reason, another researcher compiling a similar list 
might include a few more or less decisions. The differences, however, would likely be small. 
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TABLE 1: GROUNDWATER/TAKINGS CASES BY DECADE 
Pre–1960 1960–69 1970–79 1980–89 1990–99 2000–09 2010–13 
3 3 3 8 8 16 9 
Those cases also arise from all over the country.
166
 Not surprisingly, 
most come from relatively arid states, where water litigation traditionally 
has more of a prominent role. But cases arising out of relatively 
well-watered Midwestern and eastern states show that the emergence of 
groundwater/takings litigation represents a national trend. 
TABLE 2: GROUNDWATER/TAKINGS CASES BY STATE OF ORIGIN 
# Cases 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
State Florida  
Indiana  
Maryland 
Minnesota 
Nebraska  
New Hampshire 
New York 
North Dakota 
Oklahoma 
South Dakota  
California 
Colorado 
Hawaii 
Kansas 
Michigan 
New Mexico 
Utah 
Washington 
Wisconsin  
none Ohio  Nevada Arizona 
 
Texas 
 
While the cases have arisen from a wide variety of fact patterns, two 
particular types of claims dominate the field. First, eighteen of the cases 
involve as-applied challenges to restrictions on a particular landowner’s 
groundwater use.
167
 Day typifies this type of litigation.
168
 Second, nine of 
the cases challenge states’ attempts to change groundwater laws. Typical 
of this second category is Barshop v. Medina County Underground Water 
Conservation District, another Texas case involving a facial challenge to 
the Edwards Aquifer Authority Act.
169
 The remaining cases involve a wide 
 
 
 166. Because of the small sample size, one probably should not draw too many conclusions from 
the numbers from specific states. The relatively high number of Nevada cases, for example, may 
simply reflect a few litigious years for the Fallini family rather than some distinctive attribute of 
Nevada’s law or hydrology. See Fallini, 725 F. Supp. 1113; Fallini, 31 Fed. Cl. 53; Fallini, 56 F.3d 
1378. Similarly, three of the four Ohio decisions emerged from the same underlying dispute. 
 167. See, e.g., Allegretti & Co., 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 126–27 (describing how the case arose out of a 
dispute over a permit application for a new well). 
 168. 369 S.W.3d 814, 818 (Tex. 2012). 
 169. 925 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1996); see also Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968) 
(challenging North Dakota’s establishment of a prior appropriation regime and declaration that 
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variety of circumstances. In a few, groundwater users sought 
compensation after government activities—construction projects, for 
example—allegedly depleted or polluted their aquifers.170 In others, 
plaintiffs challenged restrictions on their ability to prevent wildlife from 
drinking pumped groundwater.
171
 Nevertheless, across the field of cases, 
the most frequently recurring questions concern governments’ ability to 
change groundwater law and to restrict individuals’ groundwater use. 
B. Key Lessons from the Cases 
While the geographic distribution and growing number of 
groundwater/takings cases are both intriguing, the more important lessons 
from the cases arise from their reasoning and outcomes. Below, I describe 
several of the central themes. 
1. Groundwater Use Rights as Property 
One of the first lessons from the cases involves the status of 
groundwater use rights as constitutional property. In the American legal 
tradition, and particularly in the American west, water rights are 
commonly thought of as a subspecies of property rights, and lawyers 
commonly believe—or sometimes simply assume—that those rights are 
subject to constitutional protection.
172
 Nevertheless, in recent years, a few 
commentators have questioned that assumption.
173
 They raise a mix of 
assertions, arguing both that water rights are not uniformly established as 
constitutional property and that constitutionalized water rights are 
 
 
groundwater not previously appropriated was state property); Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 
1964) (challenging a similar change in South Dakota). 
 170. See, e.g., Hensley v. City of Columbus, 557 F.3d 693, 695 (6th Cir. 2009) (alleging a taking 
after the city constructed a sewer pipeline, allegedly causing nearby wells to run dry); In re Town of 
Nottingham, 904 A.2d 582, 591–92 (N.H. 2006) (taking alleged by landowners after the state granted a 
groundwater withdrawal permit to a water bottling company); Knaust v. City of Kingston, 193 F. 
Supp. 2d 536, 539 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (claiming a taking where stormwater runoff from an adjacent 
parcel allegedly contaminated groundwater beneath the plaintiffs’ land). 
 171. See, e.g., Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113, 1122–24 (D. Nev. 1989), aff’d on other 
grounds, Fallini v. Hodel, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that such a restriction would effect a 
regulatory taking and therefore was invalid). 
 172. See Sax, supra note 29, at 260 (“Water rights are property.”) (emphasis in original). My own 
past thinking exemplifies these assumptions. I drafted Imperial County’s briefs in the Allegretti & Co. 
appellate litigation, but it never occurred to me to argue that Allegretti lacked any constitutionally 
protected right to use groundwater (we did argue that the right was less extensive than Allegretti 
claimed), even though that argument, if successful, would have won the case for my client.  
 173. See, e.g., Zellmer & Harder, supra note 33, at 741 (“[A]ppropriators possess a right to 
preclude other appropriators from using water, as well as a procedural due process right against 
capricious government action, but this is not a full private property right entitled to compensation for a 
regulatory taking.”); Saxer, supra note 33. 
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unjustified in theory and harmful in practice.
174
 Similar claims sometimes 
emerge in litigators’ briefs. In the Day litigation, for example, some amici 
argued that constitutionalizing a property right to in situ groundwater 
would sound the death knell for sensible regulation.
175
 That view also 
finds some support from comparisons with the laws of other countries. 
Many have effectively rejected regulatory takings protection for 
groundwater use rights, or for property rights more generally, without 
losing their ability to support advanced resource-based and industrial 
economies.
176
  
Nevertheless, the American groundwater/takings cases provide little 
support for arguments against treating water rights as constitutional 
property. Many cases clearly state that groundwater use rights qualify as 
constitutional property and are protected by the takings doctrine.
177
 Day 
exemplifies these cases, as does McNamara v. City of Rittman, a recent 
Ohio Supreme Court case.
178
 There, the court unequivocally concluded, 
“Ohio recognizes that landowners have a property interest in the 
groundwater underlying their land and that governmental interference with 
 
 
 174. Zellmer and Harder begin by emphasizing decisions suggesting some continued ambiguity 
about the constitutional status of water rights, and then conclude, based on a web-of-interests 
metaphor, that water rights should not receive constitutional protection. Zellmer & Harder, supra note 
33, at 732–41. Saxer’s argument is both doctrinal and functional. She cites the many traditional legal 
restrictions on water rights and the practical need to protect public interests in water as reasons against 
treating water rights as traditional property. See generally Saxer, supra note 33.  
 175. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Angela Garcia and Environmental Defense Fund at 9, 
Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964) (“[G]roundwater 
conservation districts, and particularly the EAA, would be rendered unworkable.”). Similar rhetoric 
has accompanied groundwater litigation in other states. See, e.g., Fiona Smith, Courts Tackle Water 
Ownership: A Sacramento County Case Could Determine if River is ‘Real Property’, S.F. DAILY J., 
Aug. 2, 2011, at 1 (quoting an environmental attorney’s warning that “[i]f water became real property, 
then potentially any limitation or control on the use of water for the public good would become a 
compensable taking”). 
 176. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, THE GLOBAL DEBATE OVER CONSTITUTIONAL PROPERTY: 
LESSONS FOR AMERICAN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE 139–47 (2006) (discussing groundwater use 
litigation in Germany); Dr. Bryan P. Schwartz & Melanie R. Bueckert, Regulatory Takings in Canada, 
5 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 477, 477 (“[P]roperty rights receive minimal protection under 
Canadian law.”); Kevin Guerin, Protection Against Government Takings: Compensation for 
Regulation? 16–17 (New Zealand Treasury, Working Paper No. 02/18, 2002), available at http://www 
.treasury.govt.nz/publications/research-policy/wp/2002/02-18/twp02-18.pdf (discussing New Zealand’s 
approach, which leaves compensation to the discretion of the legislature). 
 177. See, e.g., City of San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 198 P. 784, 792 (Cal. 1921) (“The 
water in all these lands, therefore, is private property, and will remain private property until it is taken 
from the owners of the land and devoted to public use.”); Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 
594 (Kan. 1962) (“The privilege of using water is unquestionably an element of the value of the land. 
To take away that right might be tantamount in a semi-arid country to confiscation of property.”); City 
of Gaylord v. Maple Manor Invs., L.L.C., No. 266954, 2006 WL 2270494, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 
8, 2006) (“We agree that the right to use groundwater is a valuable property right.”). 
 178. McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640, 643 (Ohio 2005). 
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that right can constitute an unconstitutional taking.”179 A few cases do not 
address the issue, some address it ambiguously,
180
 and some have stressed 
that the constitutional protection for water rights is weak.
181
 But I found 
only one decision that clearly rejected the idea of a property right in 
groundwater. In Village of Tequesta v. Jupiter Inlet Corp., a 1979 
decision, the Florida Supreme Court concluded a discussion of 
groundwater rights with the emphatic statement that “[t]his ‘right to use’ is 
not ‘private property’ as contemplated by article X, section 6, [of the] 
Florida Constitution requiring full compensation before taking for a public 
purpose.”182 That statement is entirely consistent with conceptions of 
water rights as sub-constitutional property. But within American 
groundwater jurisprudence, that statement also is unique. 
Of course, even if groundwater use rights traditionally count as 
property rights, not every takings plaintiff will have a valid claim to hold 
such rights. In some states, the underlying right extends only to reasonable 
uses on overlying land, or to a reasonable share of the resource, and a 
plaintiff whose use exceeds those constraints lacks a colorable claim to 
own the property that forms the basis for her takings claim.
183
 Similarly, in 
 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. See, e.g., Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 127 (Neb. 2005) (“A right to 
appropriate surface water however, is not an ownership of property. Instead, the water is viewed as a 
public want and the appropriation is a right to use the water.”). While this language seems consistent 
with the idea that water rights are not property at all, it also is consistent with the idea—which is 
present in most states’ systems of water law—that constitutionally protected property interests in water 
exist, but those interests take the form of use rights rather than of direct ownership of the physical 
water. See, e.g., Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249, 252 (1853) (“It is laid down by our law writers, that the 
right of property in water is usufructuary, and consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage 
of its use.”) (emphasis in original). 
 181. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 493 (Haw. 2000) (“Usufructuary 
water rights, in sum, ‘have always been incomplete property rights . . . .’”) (quoting A. DAN TARLOCK, 
LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES 3-153 (2000)). One federal court decision from Arizona 
appears to conclude, albeit with some ambiguity, that Arizona landowners lack any constitutionally 
protected interest in the groundwater beneath their lands. See Cherry v. Steiner, 543 F. Supp. 1270, 
1277 (D. Ariz. 1982) (“The only interpretation of Arizona law open to this Court is that a landowner 
has no interest in underlying groundwater prior to its capture.”) aff’d, 716 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983). 
But the Arizona case upon which this federal decision relied did not go quite that far. See Town of 
Chino Valley v. City of Prescott, 638 P.2d 1324 (Ariz. 1982). Prescott held (1) that overlying 
landowners did not have vested ownership of the physical water beneath their lands, and instead only 
held usufructuary rights to use that water; and (2) that those usufructuary rights were appropriately 
subject to regulation. Id. at 1328–29. That is not the same as holding that landowners had no 
constitutionally protected water right at all. A usufructuary right can be a constitutionally protected 
property right, and under American takings doctrine, most, if not all, constitutionally protected 
property rights are subject to regulation. Consequently, Prescott does not actually state the categorical 
rule that Cherry appears to have extracted from it. 
 182. 371 So. 2d 663, 670 (Fla. 1979). 
 183. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 467–85 (describing groundwater management 
doctrines). The presence of such “reasonable use” limitations provides an additional reason why 
takings claims in those jurisdictions should rarely prevail. Government restrictions will usually involve 
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western states that have integrated groundwater use rights into their prior 
appropriation systems, an overlying landowner may not have any property 
interest in the use of groundwater beneath his land, and a junior 
appropriator has no property right to uses that interfere with his seniors.
184
 
Consequently, a key litigation issue in several groundwater/takings cases 
has been whether the plaintiff actually owns the allegedly taken 
property.
185
 But even when courts have answered that question in the 
negative, they generally have done so because that particular plaintiff 
lacked a property interest, not because the state excludes groundwater use 
rights from the realm of property.
186
 
Obviously that finding is not fatal to the normative or theoretical 
arguments against constitutionalizing groundwater rights, or water rights 
more generally. Sometimes historical practices are misguided, and 
sometimes precedent should be overturned.
187
 But the prevalence of 
constitutionally protected groundwater rights nevertheless creates two 
challenges for arguments against treating water rights as property. First, 
while sometimes property law traditions merely reflect the unjust power 
dynamics of an earlier age, on many other occasions they do reflect 
received wisdom and traditions born of experience.
188
 Second, stability in 
property law, as in most areas of law, is valuable in its own right; change 
can disrupt expectations and plans.
189
 For both of those reasons, the 
 
 
trying to strike a reasonable balance among competing uses. But, as discussed in more detail below 
and in Part III, there is little basis for granting groundwater use rights heightened takings protection 
even in jurisdictions that do not include a reasonable use element in their system of groundwater 
rights. 
 184. See THOMPSON ET AL., supra note 24, at 485–87 (describing the application of prior 
appropriation doctrine to groundwater). 
 185. See, e.g., Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728, 731–34 (N.D. 1968) (rejecting a constitutional 
challenge to state laws because the challenger lacked a vested right to groundwater beneath his land); 
see also Sierra Nevada SW Enters. v. King, No. 3:10-CV-579-RCJ-RAM, 2011 WL 3204737, at *10 
(D. Nev. July 27, 2011) (“[T]he Court dismisses Plaintiff’s takings claim because there is no taking for 
the denial of a permit for the approval of stand-alone water rights where such approval would be in 
derogation of other prior appropriated rights.”); Kobobel v. State Dep’t of Natural Res., 249 P.3d 
1127, 1133–38 (Colo. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting a takings claim because the groundwater users lacked 
any property right to pump where that pumping would interfere with the rights of more senior 
appropriators). 
 186. See, e.g., Kobobel, 249 P.3d. at 1137 n.9 (“[I]t is possible to assert a valid takings claim in a 
water rights context.”); Sierra Nevada S.W. Enterprises, 2011 WL 3204737, at *10 (“Plaintiff does 
have a property right in his appropriated water rights.”). 
 187. Historic laws allowing people to hold other people as property, whether as slaves or through 
marriage, provide obvious examples. 
 188. For example, many of our most commonplace property rights, like fee simple ownership or 
leaseholds, reflect a shared understanding that some certainty and transferability in property rights can 
facilitate individual security and economic growth. 
 189. See Carol M. Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes and Variations in American Law, 
2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2 (“There is a longstanding and very powerful argument that the stability of 
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prevalence of a legal practice therefore should create a presumption—
albeit a weak and rebuttable one—that continuing the practice makes some 
sense.  
2. Deference to Regulatory Authority 
The tradition of treating water rights as constitutional property also 
allows us to consider whether the perceived dangers of constitutionally 
protected water rights have come to fruition. Among the commentators 
and litigants who have argued against constitutionalizing water rights, the 
primary fear has been that constitutional protection of water rights will 
inevitably lead to severe restrictions on governments’ ability to regulate 
those rights. As one environmental group’s amicus brief in the Day 
litigation direly put it, “[i]f this theory were to prevail in this Court, 
groundwater conservation in Texas would be finished.”190 In the Day 
litigation, those warnings led, somewhat ironically, to a counterargument 
from the plaintiffs’ supporting amici, some of whom took pains to explain 
that property rights can be and routinely are subject to extensive regulatory 
oversight.
191
 But in the broader property rights debate, the 
environmentalists’ fears are almost exactly concordant with property 
rights advocates’ hopes. For most property rights advocates, constitutional 
property rights are a means to anti-regulatory ends.
192
 That debate raises 
the question: have past courts’ treatment of groundwater use rights as 
constitutional property led to doctrinal restrictions on groundwater 
regulation? 
There is little evidence that they have. In the pool of decisions 
available on Lexis and Westlaw, government defendants have done quite 
well, winning the vast majority of the cases.
193
 Even where government 
 
 
property is essential to economic well-being.”). 
 190. Post-Submission Amicus Brief of the Texas Alliance of Groundwater Districts at 1, Edwards 
Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964). 
 191. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Mesa Water, L.P. at 26, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 
S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964) (“But the fact remains that regulation and ownership are not 
mutually exclusive.”). 
 192. See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION—A 
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 183 (1991) (explaining how conservative activists hoped “to use the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment as a severe brake upon federal and state regulation of business and 
property”); Eduardo Moisès Peñalver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership 
in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227, 282 (2004) (discussing the close relationship 
between the property-rights movement and opposition to environmental regulation). 
 193. Government defendants lost the following cases: Williamson v. Guadalupe Cnty. 
Groundwater Conservation Dist., 343 F. Supp. 2d 580, 598–99 (W.D. Tex. 2004) (holding that the 
case was ripe, and denying a motion to dismiss); Fallini v. Hodel, 725 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Nev. 1989), 
aff’d on other grounds, Fallini v. Hodel, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1992); City Mill Co. v. Honolulu 
Sewer & Water Comm’n, 30 Haw. 912, 947 (Haw. 1929); Jones v. East Lansing-Meridian Water & 
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defendants have lost, the loss has often been on a motion to dismiss or for 
summary judgment, and the case has continued onward.
194
 Only four 
courts have found a taking.
195
 In two of these cases, the court did not order 
payment of damages,
196
 and in one controversy, a subsequent damages 
claim failed.
197
 Only in Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority, the most 
recent case out of Texas, has a court found a taking and concluded that 
compensation should be paid.
198
 Case outcomes cannot reveal all the ways 
in which constitutionalized water rights are affecting water management, 
for fears of takings claims may affect regulatory approaches even if few 
takings claims actually prevail.
199
 Nevertheless, case outcomes do offer at 
least some evidence of actual practices, and these outcomes therefore 
provide ample reason to think that constitutionalized groundwater rights 
can coexist with robust government regulation. 
The reasoning of the decisions also supplies ample support for 
government regulatory authority. In decision after decision, courts have 
explained, often in great detail, the essential importance of groundwater
 
 
Sewer Auth., 296 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); McNamara v. City of Rittman, 838 N.E.2d 640 
(Ohio 2005) (finding that plaintiffs had a property interest in subterranean groundwater); Edwards 
Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (finding an ownership interest in subterranean 
groundwater); Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838 
(Aug. 28, 2013) (finding a taking); and Lesaffre Yeast Corp. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 662 
N.W.2d 678 (Wis. 2003) (unpublished opinion reversing summary judgment in favor of the 
government defendant). 
 194. See, e.g., Williamson, 343 F. Supp. 2d at 598–99 (holding that the case was ripe, and denying 
a motion to dismiss); McNamara, 838 N.E. 2d. 640 (finding that plaintiffs had a property interest in 
subterranean groundwater); Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (finding an ownership interest in subterranean 
groundwater); Lesaffre Yeast Corp., 662 N.W.2d 678 (unpublished opinion reversing summary 
judgment in favor of the government defendant) 
 195. See Fallini, 725 F. Supp. at 1113; Bragg, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838; City Mill Co., 30 
Haw. at 947; Jones, 296 N.W.2d at 202. Fallini involved restrictions on a rancher’s ability to keep 
wild animals from drinking from groundwater-fed troughs. The court held that the restrictions were 
arbitrary and capricious in part because they would create a taking. In City Mill Co., the court set aside 
a restriction on new well construction, reasoning that to prohibit new construction while allowing 
continuation of existing pumping would take property rights. In Jones, the plaintiffs argued, 
successfully, that the defendant authority had taken their rights by pumping in excess of its own rights. 
 196. In Jones, the court did remand for determination of damages. 296 N.W.2d at 205. However, 
Jones involved government acting as a competing consumptive user of groundwater, not as a regulator. 
Id. 
 197. See Fallini v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 53 (1994), vacated and remanded by Fallini v. 
United States, 56 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 198. 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838. 
 199. See ECHEVERRIA, supra note 150, at 5 (noting a tendency to react to potential takings claims 
by waiving regulations). 
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use regulation. For example, in Southwest Engineering Co. v. Ernst,
200
 the 
Arizona Supreme Court observed: 
The supply of ground water within the territorial boundaries of the 
state, or any particular groundwater basin therein, is not unlimited 
and even though in some instances the limits thereof may be 
difficult to apprehend, ultimately and inevitably at one time or 
another it will become necessary to restrict the use merely because 
the available users and uses exceed the available supply.
201
 
Similarly, in Bamford v. Upper Republican Natural Resources 
District,
202
 the Nebraska Supreme Court succinctly summarized the 
prevailing view when it concluded “placing limitations upon withdrawals 
of ground water in times of shortage is a proper exercise of the State’s 
police power.”203 Neither statement is at all exceptional. 
In accordance with that view, courts have often affirmed the ability of 
state legislatures and local governments to change state groundwater law, 
even where the changes effectively infringe rights that previously were 
unlimited. That affirmation comes from old and new cases, from relatively 
conservative and relatively liberal states, and from states with all sorts of 
common-law groundwater doctrines.
204
 For example, the Oklahoma 
Supreme Court recently rejected a challenge to regulatory legislation 
imposing new limits on groundwater use. It premised its decision largely 
on “[t]he general rule . . . that the Legislature may restrict the use and 
enjoyment of the state’s water resources by exercise of its police power for 
the preservation of the public health, safety and welfare without 
compensating the property owner.”205 In Ernst, the 1955 Arizona Supreme 
Court case quoted above, the court stressed the same point, stating: “We 
do not doubt that it is the proper sphere of the legislature, in the interest of 
the general welfare, to say when that time [for groundwater use 
 
 
 200. 291 P.2d 764 (Ariz. 1955). Ernst involved a challenge to state laws that restricted the drilling 
of new wells in areas with groundwater shortages. Id. 
 201. Id. at 770. See also F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1174 (Kan. 1981) 
(describing how demands placed upon the Ogallala Aquifer justify legislative intervention). 
 202. 512 N.W.2d 642 (Neb. 1994). Bamford involved a challenge to a water district’s cease and 
desist order; the order had prohibited pumping from nine wells located within a “control area.” Id. 
 203. Id. at 652. 
 204. See, e.g., In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 492–95 (Haw. 2000) (noting that 
such transitions have been found constitutional in many states); Natural Res. Comm’n v. Amax Coal 
Co., 638 N.E.2d 418, 429 (Ind. 1994) (“The State can regulate the use of property without destroying 
rights in that property.”); City of Gaylord v. Maple Manor Invs., L.L.C., No. 266954, 2006 WL 
2270494, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 8, 2006) (acknowledging that groundwater use rights are 
property rights, but adding: “we do not agree that home rule cities lack the authority to enact 
ordinances that affect property rights”). 
 205. Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842, 855 (Okla. 2006) (emphasis omitted). 
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restrictions] has arrived . . . .”206 Again, neither statement is anomalous.207 
Moreover, a contrary narrative, in which groundwater use regulation 
represents government run amok, makes rare appearances in groundwater 
decisions almost exclusively in dissents.
208
 
Finally, the cases have either ignored or affirmatively rejected modes 
of takings analysis that would drastically limit governmental regulatory 
authority. The most prominent example of this rejection involves 
arguments that water use restrictions should be analyzed as potential 
physical takings. Those arguments have emerged most prominently in 
cases involving surface waters, and, as discussed above, they gained a 
narrow foothold in two recent decisions, one from the Federal Court of 
Claims and the other from the Federal Circuit.
209
 Building on those 
successes, plaintiffs in groundwater/takings cases have argued that a 
physical takings analysis is the traditional and appropriate method for 
analyzing a regulatory restriction on groundwater use.
210
 But they have 
never succeeded. In the full set of regulatory groundwater/takings cases 
available on Lexis and Westlaw, not one has used a physical takings 
analysis, or has endorsed any other sort of categorical takings test.
211
 The 
cases that have addressed the issue have squarely rejected that approach.
212
 
 
 
 206. Sw. Eng’g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764, 770 (Ariz. 1955). 
 207. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Wichita, 374 P.2d 578, 589 (Kan. 1962) (affirming “the basic 
power of the legislature to modify and change common-law rules with respect to water usage”). 
 208. See, e.g., id. at 596 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (“If such arbitrary exercise of the police power 
of the state withstands the federal constitutional test of due process, the formula has been found, and 
the precedent is established, by which all private property within Kansas may be communized without 
cost to the state.”) (emphasis in original); F. Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 630 P.2d 1164, 1175 
(Kan. 1981) (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (“Application of this rule under the Act for the purported 
purpose of preventing waste and conserving natural resources is, of course, nothing more than a 
redistribution of the wealth to the favored few after the initial confiscation of the landowner’s vested 
rights to his property.”). 
 209. See supra text accompanying notes 137–41 (discussing Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage 
Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313 (2001), and Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 543 F.3d 
1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); but see CRV Enters., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241, 1246–48 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (holding that a water use restriction did not qualify as a physical taking). 
 210. See, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 125, 129 (Ct. App. 
2006); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioners and Respondents 
Burrell Day and Joel McDaniel at 22–24, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) 
(No. 08-0964).  
 211. In Lesaffre Yeast Corp. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 662 N.W.2d 678 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 2003) (unpublished opinion), a Wisconsin appellate court concluded that a plaintiffs claim should 
have been analyzed as a potential physical takings claim. Id. at *3. That case did not involve 
regulatory activity, however. The defendant government entity had allegedly contaminated the 
plaintiffs’ groundwater by building a tunnel. Id. at *1. 
 212. See Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 839 (Tex. 2012) (“The first category—
involving a physical invasion of property—does not apply to the present case.”); Allegretti & Co. v. 
Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122, 130–31 (Ct. App. 2006) (“County’s action with respect to 
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The traditional judicial approach therefore creates challenges for those 
arguing that water rights should be categorically excluded from, or 
categorically favored in, takings law.
213
 On the one hand, the cases show 
that constitutionalized property and regulation are compatible.
214
 That 
should not be particularly surprising, for the status of land as constitutional 
property and the authority of government to regulate land use both have 
been largely beyond dispute throughout our nation’s history.215 The 
groundwater cases simply show that the same balancing act is possible—
and, indeed, traditional—for water.216 On the other hand, the cases 
demonstrate the absence of any historical basis or judicial precedent for 
analyzing regulatory restrictions on groundwater use as potential physical 
takings, or under any other sort of test that provides groundwater rights 
with more protection than other forms of property. Groundwater cases 
have presented courts with dozens of opportunities to take those 
approaches, and in the pool of decisions available on Lexis and Westlaw, 
the courts have uniformly declined them.
217
 
Nevertheless, relative consistency of past practices does not ensure that 
future cases will use similar analytical methods or reach the same 
outcomes. Initially, an ambiguity generated by past groundwater/takings 
cases may afford future courts some flexibility to pursue different 
approaches.
218
 In many cases, courts place heavy emphasis on what they 
 
 
Allegretti in the present case—imposition of a permit condition limiting the total quantity of 
groundwater available for Allegretti’s use—cannot be characterized as or analogized to the kinds of 
permanent physical occupancies or invasions sufficient to constitute a categorical physical taking.”). 
 213. The cases do not create any problem for, and indeed support, those who argue that water 
rights are constitutional property, but that a takings claim involving water rights should be quite 
difficult to prove. See supra text accompanying notes 146–48. 
 214. For a broader comparative argument in support of this point, see ALEXANDER, supra note 
176, at 23–62. 
 215. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 
109 HARV. L. REV. 1252 (1996) (arguing that land use regulation has been pervasive since the colonial 
era). 
 216. Again, the cases do not undermine arguments that water rights, though constitutional 
property, should be the basis for successful takings claims less often than rights in land. The authors 
who put forth those arguments generally ground them in traditional takings doctrine. Their argument is 
that because water rights generally are subject to more factual and legal limitations than other forms of 
property, Lucas and Penn Central analyses should very rarely lead courts to conclude that takings have 
occurred. 
 217. For discussion of case outcomes, see supra text accompanying notes 193–97. 
 218. Another interesting uncertainty concerns the property interest the court should use when 
measuring the extent of a regulation’s impact. Some courts have treated the groundwater use right as 
an independent right, see, e.g., Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct. App. 
2006), while others have treated the groundwater use right as part of a landownership right. See, e.g., 
City of Gaylord v. Maple Manor Invs. L.L.C., No. 266954, 2006 WL 2270494, at *7 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2006). Though both of these cases denied takings claims, the difference could be crucially important. 
See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1065–66 (1992) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (discussing 
the implications of this “denominator” problem). 
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describe as a compelling government interest in groundwater regulation.
219
 
For example, in Southwest Engineering Company v. Ernst, the Arizona 
Supreme Court justified its rejection of a takings claim by noting that 
“[w]here the public interest is thus significantly involved, the preferment 
of that interest over the property interest of the individual even to the 
extent of its destruction is a distinguishing characteristic of the exercise of 
the police power.”220 That emphasis is consistent with older Supreme 
Court takings cases that treat the government’s police power to regulate 
harms as a powerful defense.
221
 But more recently, the Supreme Court has 
seemed—at least sometimes—to back away from this sort of reasoning. In 
Lucas, for example, the Court reversed a South Carolina Supreme Court 
decision premised on the government’s police power to prevent harm, and 
Justice Scalia pointedly argued that harm-based reasoning is too malleable 
to be workable.
222
 Then, in Lingle, the entire court agreed that a takings 
analysis generally “presupposes that the government has acted in pursuit 
of a valid public purpose” and instead should focus on the impact to the 
plaintiff.
223
 None of these recent cases clearly removes government 
interests from takings analysis, and indeed, many judges and 
commentators have argued that a coherent and just takings doctrine cannot 
possibly compel courts to ignore why the government did what it did.
224
 
But they do suggest a reduced, and perhaps somewhat ambiguous, role for 
government interests in the takings analysis.
225
 Even that change might 
 
 
 219. See, e.g., Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708, 711 (S.D. 1964); Peterson v. Dep’t of Ecology, 
596 P.2d 285, 290 (Wash. 1979) (“The relevant inquiry in such a challenge is whether the regulatory 
scheme is an exercise of police power rather than one of condemnation.”); supra text accompanying 
notes 200–07 (discussing additional decisions affirming public regulatory authority). 
 220. 291 P.2d 764, 768 (Ariz. 1955); Grimes, 127 N.W.2d at 711 (quoting this language from 
Ernst). For a brief summary of the basic dispute in Ernst, see supra note 200. 
 221. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 409–10 (1915) (invoking the police power 
as grounds to sustain a regulation despite severe economic impacts). 
 222. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1020–27 (1992). 
 223. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005); see Fenster, supra note 123, at 535 
(“Lingle clarifies that in all cases, courts considering a regulatory takings claim may consider only the 
challenged regulation’s effects on property and the rights of ownership, and not the validity of the 
regulation and regulatory program itself.”). 
 224. E.g. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1075–76 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the purpose of the 
regulation should be relevant); Thomas W. Merrill, Why Lingle Is Half Right, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 421 
(2010) (also arguing that the purposes of the government’s action should be relevant to a takings 
analysis); Fenster, supra note 123, at 564–73 (arguing that the “character of the government action” 
analytical prong does and should allow for such analysis); John D. Echeverria, Making Sense of Penn 
Central, 23 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 171, 175–76 (2005). 
 225. See Rubenfeld, supra note 124, at 1100 (describing the Court’s “simultaneous attraction 
toward and repulsion from” harm-based analysis). 
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afford an opportunity for courts to revisit the basic compromise enshrined 
in past groundwater/takings decisions. 
Heightening the temptation to change course may be the emergence in 
groundwater/takings cases of a new set of governmental interests. Ernst 
and its contemporary cases were not environmental law cases, at least as 
we now would understand the concept.
226
 Instead, the regulatory schemes 
at issue simply shifted between alternative regimes for refereeing (or not 
refereeing) groundwater disputes among competing human users. But 
many of the more recent groundwater cases do have an environmental 
component.
227
 Some involve the direct application of environmental 
regulations, and others involve three-way competitions among human 
users and environmental needs, but in either circumstance, government is 
limiting groundwater use partly to preserve environmental values.
228
 To 
some judges and commentators, that shift may make no difference at all, 
but to others it may be quite important.
229
 A distinct lack of sympathy for 
environmental regulation pervades many of the conservative Supreme 
Court justices’ recent opinions, both within and outside the takings field, 
and the broader property rights movement is in large part a reaction to the 
emergence of environmental controls.
230
 Consequently, judges who might 
 
 
 226. See supra text accompanying notes 200–02 (describing the disputes in these cases). In Ernst, 
for example, the Arizona Supreme Court clearly explained that the main threat was to agriculture, not 
the natural environment:  
The legislative finding that the exhaustion of ground water by excessive withdrawals 
threatens to destroy one of the principal economic resources of the state to the consequential 
serious injury of all is not disputed. Such a conclusion is obviously justified because 
unrestrained use must inevitably result either in complete exhaustion of the state’s ground 
water so that in the end the lands dependent thereon will revert to their desert state or in the 
lowering of water tables so that the increased cost of pumping will reduce these lands to a 
marginal or submarginal condition. 
Sw. Eng’g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764, 768 (Ariz. 1955) (footnote omitted).  
 227. For example, the dispute in Allegretti & Co. v. Cnty. of Imperial, 42 Cal. Rptr. 3d 122 (Ct. 
App. 2006) originated because the County asked the landowner to submit to environmental review of 
his new well. See also supra text accompanying notes 38–44 (describing how environmental 
restrictions led to the legislative scheme challenged in multiple Edwards Aquifer takings cases); 
Jacobs Ranch, L.L.C. v. Smith, 148 P.3d 842, 848 (Okla. 2006) (describing environmental impacts that 
helped create the need for the challenged regulations). 
 228. See, e.g., Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 818–19 (Tex. 2012) (summarizing 
the purposes of the regulatory scheme for the Edwards Aquifer). 
 229. See Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1433, 1438–39 (1993) (explaining Lucas as a direct 
reaction to the ideas of the environmental movement). 
 230. See, e.g., Sackett v. EPA, 132 S. Ct. 1367, 1375 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (“The position 
taken in this case by the Federal Government . . . would have put the property rights of ordinary 
Americans entirely at the mercy of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) employees.”); Rapanos v. 
United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (lamenting “[t]he burden of federal regulation” of wetlands, 
and claiming that “the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) exercises the discretion of an 
enlightened despot”); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 637 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
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have sympathized with governments’ need to protect human consumptive 
users from each other may have very different reactions when the 
regulatory regime’s purpose is wetlands preservation or endangered 
species protection.
231
 
Of course, courts—and, perhaps more importantly, legislators—do not 
need doctrinal instability in order to move the law in a new direction. The 
fact that our legal and political culture has traditionally supported 
regulatory oversight of groundwater use rights does not mean it will be 
nearly so deferential in the future. Cultures change, skepticism of 
government regulation remains prevalent, and litigators and some judges 
already are vigorously advocating for a different future approach.
232
 For 
that reason, the Day decision might someday turn out to be just as limiting 
for Texas groundwater regulation as its detractors currently fear, and 
copycat decisions might emerge across the American landscape. Indeed, 
there already are hints of such a transformation. In early 2011, apparently 
for the first time in American groundwater/takings jurisprudence, a court 
ordered a government defendant to pay compensation for a taking of 
groundwater use rights.
233
 Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Authority arose out 
of a fact pattern much like that in Day, or, for that matter, in a great many 
other groundwater/takings cases. Agricultural landowners challenged 
regulatory limits on their ability to pump, and those limits in turn derived 
from the well-documented shortages plaguing the aquifer.
234
 This time, 
however, the result was different: the trial court found a taking,
235
 and in 
August 2013, Texas’ Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.236 For the 
 
 
(characterizing regulatory protection of wetlands as “malefaction”); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s holding that the 
hunting and killing prohibition incidentally preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the 
point of financial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who finds his land 
conscripted to national zoological use.”). 
 231. See Peñalver, supra note 192, at 282 (discussing how this hostility to environmental 
regulation has shaped the “property rights” movement and affected the Court); Richard J. Lazarus, 
Putting the Correct “Spin” on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1414–18 (1993) (discussing how 
conservative opposition to environmental regulation influenced the emergence of modern takings 
doctrine). 
 232. See Underkuffler, supra note 132, at 731–32 (describing Justice Scalia’s vision of takings 
doctrine). 
 233. Second Amended Final Judgment, Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., Cause No. 06-11-18170 
(Medina Cnty., Tex. Dist. Ct., filed Mar. 25, 2011). 
 234. See Cross-Appellants’ Brief at 4-13, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, 2013 Tex. App. 
LEXIS 10838 (Aug. 28, 2013) (No. 04-11-00018-CV ) (summarizing the factual basis for the Braggs’ 
argument). 
 235. Second Amended Final Judgment, Bragg v. Edwards Aquifer Auth., Cause No. 06-11-18170 
(Medina Cnty., Tex. Dist. Ct., filed Mar. 25, 2011). 
 236. Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Bragg, No. 04-11-00018-CV, 2013 Tex. App. LEXIS 10838. The 
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plaintiffs, it was a dramatic win with a rather promising damages formula: 
the court held that the taken property was not some reasonable share of the 
aquifer’s water but instead “the unlimited use of water to irrigate a 
commercial-grade pecan orchard.”237 As of this writing, the time for 
appeals has not run, and the Edwards Aquifer Authority may soon be back 
before the Texas Supreme Court. 
III. GROUNDWATER, TAKINGS, AND PROPERTY THEORIES 
The central conclusion of the preceding section is that traditional 
groundwater/takings jurisprudence tracks traditional takings law, and that 
such jurisprudence has allowed extensive government regulation of 
groundwater rights. Nevertheless, as the Bragg litigation signals, 
arguments for a different approach are still very much in play, and some 
judges and legislators may well be tempted to chart a different course. If 
lawmakers do entertain that possibility, they probably will seek guidance 
from broader principles of property law. For that reason, this section asks 
the basic question: in light of key theories of property law, what approach 
to takings cases involving groundwater makes sense? 
The analysis that follows comes with a caveat. I do not base it on the 
premise that judges or legislators, let alone lay people, ground their 
approach to takings doctrine in any discrete property theory.
238
 Even 
attorneys typically derive their notions of property as much from historical 
contingencies and habitual conventional wisdom as from theories, and 
they are more likely to use an amalgamation of multiple theories than a 
single construct.
239
 Moreover, few, if any, property theorists can purport to 
have found a coherent and unified theory of property law, and many 
instead craft their concepts of property by drawing on multiple theoretical 
traditions.
240
 Nevertheless, property theories underpin almost any lawyer’s 
or judge’s conceptualization of takings doctrine, even if those theories are 
often blended, underdeveloped, or indeterminate, and such theories 
certainly will influence the future development of groundwater law.
241
 An 
 
 
appellate court did remand the case for a new damages calculation. 
 237. Id. at *87. 
 238. See Laura S. Underkuffler-Freund, Takings and the Nature of Property, 9 CAN. J. L. & 
JURISPRUDENCE 161, 165 (1996) (“[F]inding any coherent, underlying understanding of 
constitutionally cognizable property in Supreme Court takings cases is a challenging task.”). 
 239. See generally STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF HOW, WHY, AND 
WHAT WE OWN (2011) (describing the historic evolution of various property law concepts). 
 240. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 36 (drawing on natural law, utilitarian, and originalist 
arguments to support a theory of takings); Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 238, at 193 (arguing that 
property is best understood “a bipartite entity” supported by two competing conceptual models). 
 241. See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER & EDUARDO M. PEÑALVER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss2/1
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exploration of property theories’ implications for groundwater 
management therefore can help inform those future developments.
242
 
A. Natural Rights 
For lawyers and judges seeking to resolve groundwater/takings 
controversies, one potential source of guidance is a natural rights theory of 
property. Such a theory posits that law should reflect “a prepolitical and 
prelegal conception of property,” which derives not from the compromises 
of political bodies, the contingencies of history, or even calculations of 
economic utility, but instead from some deeper set of foundational 
premises.
243
 Such theories are not presently in fashion among legal 
scholars, many of whom question the notion that any property right could 
exist prior to its endorsement by a political and legal community.
244
 But 
the notion of natural property rights clearly is not absurd, for our society’s 
concepts of political liberty and human rights draw upon similar ideas, 
with much less controversy.
245
 At times in our nation’s history, natural 
rights theories also dominated judges’ conceptions of property law.246 
 
 
THEORY xi (2012) (“At the base of every single property debate are competing theories of property—
different understandings of what property is, why we have it, and what its proper limitations are.”); 
see, e.g., Underkuffler-Freund, supra note 238, at 194–202 (explaining how competing theories 
underlie the Court’s analysis in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council). 
 242. Another caveat concerns the scope of the analysis. An extraordinary volume of writing 
considers the conceptual foundations of property law, and considering all of the permutations of theory 
within those articles and books would require much more than just a few pages of analysis in the final 
section of a law review article. The pages that follow therefore will focus only on the implications of a 
representative range of classic property theories. 
 243. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 
1549, 1560 (2003); see City of Norwood v. Horney, 853 N.E.2d 1115, 1128 (Ohio 2006) (“Believed to 
be derived fundamentally from a higher authority and natural law, property rights were so sacred that 
they could not be entrusted lightly to ‘the uncertain virtue of those who govern.’”) (quoting Parham v. 
Justices of Decatur Cnty. Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341, 348 (Ga. 1851)). See also Paul J. Otterstedt, A 
Natural Rights Approach to Regulatory Takings, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25 (2002). For an argument 
that utility and natural law actually are closely intertwined, see Richard A. Epstein, The Utilitarian 
Foundations of Natural Law, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713 (1989). 
 244. See, e.g., ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE 
OWNERSHIP OF LAND (2007) (arguing that property cannot exist without political and legal 
affirmation); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Restoring the Right Constitution?, 116 YALE L.J. 732, 763–64 
(2007) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY (2004)) (discussing the widespread distrust of natural rights theories among left-leaning 
academics); William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 
573–74 (1972) (arguing that the term “natural law” is “an empty vessel into which one can pour almost 
anything”). 
 245. See, e.g., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“We hold these truths 
to be self-evident . . . .”). 
 246. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE 
REGULATORY STATE 18 (1990) (describing how American judges in the late nineteenth century 
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Even today, those notions continue to exert a powerful hold on popular 
imaginations, litigators’ rhetoric, and, sometimes, judicial decisions.247 In 
short, natural rights theories, though often criticized, remain relevant. 
Some natural rights theories also have clear implications for 
groundwater/takings debates. For example, many libertarian-leaning 
thinkers argue that a principle of first possession should transcend political 
affirmation.
248
 Consequently, they argue, any regulatory restriction that 
does not protect the value held by all present property owners should be 
treated as a taking.
249
 For groundwater use rights, the implications of that 
theory are fairly clear.
250
 Such a conception of property rights would not 
preclude all regulation of groundwater, for sometimes regulation can 
enhance everyone’s property values by precluding a tragedy of the 
commons.
251
 But that conception of natural rights would place far greater 
limits on the ability of government to revise rights in ways that benefit 
some extractive users at the expense of others.
252
 And, perhaps even more 
clearly, it would limit the ability of government to impose environmental 
 
 
perceived many legal principles as “neutral and pre-political”); Claeys, supra note 243 (describing the 
influence of natural rights theories upon nineteenth century jurisprudence). 
 247. One passage from a brief in the Texas groundwater litigation captures particularly well the 
sense that property rights should transcend economic analysis. See Burrell Day and Joel McDaniel’s 
Response to Petition for Review by the State of Texas at 6, Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 
S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012) (No. 08-0964) (“It is disappointing to these Texans that the Executive Branch 
is taking an official position . . . that it will cost too much to recognize the right of private property. 
There is a trail of blood from the venerable Alamo to the San Jacinto Monument 200 miles away that 
resulted in our Texas Constitution. How much was that cost?”) (emphasis omitted). 
 248. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221 (1979). 
While the links between libertarian property ideals and natural rights theory are close, not all 
libertarians derive their views from natural rights, and not all natural rights theorists are libertarian. For 
example, Epstein also draws heavily on utilitarianism and on arguments grounded in theories of 
constitutional interpretation. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 36. Likewise, natural rights ideals also 
can support communitarian conceptions of property. See Peñalver, supra note 192, at 279. 
 249. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 36. Claeys argues for a similar rule, though his argument 
is grounded partly in a labor-based natural rights theory. See Claeys, supra note 243, at 1572–73 
(arguing that a regulatory restriction is a taking unless it “restricts the use rights of every person in 
order to enlarge both the personal rights and freedom of action of everyone regulated”). For discussion 
of the influence of such views on United States Supreme Court decisions, see supra notes 131–32 and 
supra text accompanying notes 133–34. 
 250. That theory would still raise questions about what steps are necessary to establish possession 
of a groundwater right. Is mere landownership sufficient, or must one actually use the groundwater? 
One possible answer to this question would be to look to the various ways state law defines 
groundwater rights, and to establish different first possession standards in states with correlative, 
appropriative, and rule-of-capture regimes. That approach, however, would rely on political and 
historical factors to set the bounds of a purportedly natural right, which seems paradoxical. 
 251. See Claeys, supra note 243, at 1572–73 (arguing that a regulation is not a taking “if it 
restricts the use rights of every person in order to enlarge both the personal rights and freedom of 
action of everyone regulated”). 
 252. See id. at 1573 (arguing that traditional natural law theories would lead to a takings finding 
“if some individuals lose more than their equal share of use rights without gain”). 
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restrictions upon groundwater use, unless those benefits brought offsetting 
benefits to the restricted users.
253
 
Many advocates and commentators find that theory compelling, and 
similar notions seem to inform many prominent takings cases.
254
 As 
anyone who teaches property-related subjects quickly learns, the idea that 
existing property rights should transcend political control also continues to 
exert a powerful hold on many Americans’ conceptions of property law.255 
Nevertheless, there are two problems with applying this particular natural 
rights theory to groundwater use. The first problem is that this is not the 
only natural rights theory vying for attention, and the alternative theories 
would lead to very different outcomes. The second problem is the absence 
of any compelling basis for choosing this particular natural rights theory 
over its competitors. 
One of those competing natural rights theories would ground property 
rights in the intuitive notion that people are entitled to the fruits of their 
own labor.
256
 Unlike a theory of first possession, that theory implies only 
limited protection for groundwater rights. The reason, in a nutshell, is that 
very little of groundwater’s value derives from the labor of the users who 
hope to exploit it. With rare exceptions, people do not create their own 
aquifers.
257
 They exist because of natural processes, and they remain 
 
 
 253. See id. 
 254. See Underkuffler, supra note 132, at 731–32 (tracing the influence of similar views upon 
several Supreme Court takings decisions). 
 255. See Cherie Metcalf, Property Rights and Attitudes toward Environmental Regulation: An 
Empirical Investigation 26 (July 26, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1987028 (finding that an “overwhelming majority of respondents” to a survey administered 
in the United States and Canada “feel that compensation ought to be available” in a case where 
regulations diminished property values, “despite the fact that there is likely no legal basis to claim it in 
either country”); Janice Nadler et al., Government Takings of Private Property, in PUBLIC OPINION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 286, 286–309 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) 
(summarizing polls showing widespread opposition to uncompensated governmental restrictions on 
property use). However, polling also commonly finds widespread support for environmental 
regulation, which narrowly suggests that people’s answers may reflect the framing of the question, and 
more broadly suggests some internal tensions in people’s views on property and regulation. See id.; 
Kenrick Pierre, The Susceptibility of Property Rights Heuristics to Framing in Public Opinion Polls 
and Voting: An Application to Wetlands Policy (unpublished manuscript), available at https://www 
.msu.edu/user/schmid/pierre.htm. 
 256. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT 134 (Thomas I. Cook ed., Hafner 
Publishing Co., 1947) (1689) (“The labour of his body and the work of his hands, we may say, are 
properly his.”).  
 257. The exceptions are conjunctive use projects, in which water users pump surface water into 
the subsurface and use the resulting aquifers as a storage reservoir, and aquifers created through the 
infiltration of excess irrigation water or through leakage from irrigation ditches. See Thompson, supra 
note 27, at 308 (describing conjunctive use); David C. Sweigert, Lining Canals in the Border Region: 
Can the U.S. Ignore Impacts on Mexico?, ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J., Jan. 1991, at 15, 17–18 
(1991). 
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present in part because of the restraint of other potential users.
258
 With 
similarly rare exceptions, individual landowners also are not responsible 
for the quality of the water in their aquifers. Unless a landowner owns the 
entire recharge zone for an aquifer, water quality again will depend upon 
natural processes and on the willingness of other landowners to preserve 
those processes.
259
 Exploiting this natural and societal largesse does 
require some labor, for one must build and operate a well and obtain a 
permit (at least in some states and for some users).
260
 But the role of 
individual labor in defining groundwater’s value still is far less substantial 
than the role of individual labor in giving value to a piece of intellectual 
property like a book or a computer program, and the role of natural capital 
and community behavior is much greater. Indeed, and in stark contrast to 
works like books or computer programs, there is a partially inverse 
relationship between individual labor and value, for the value of any 
limited natural resource can be diminished by individual exploitation. 
Consequently, a natural rights theory grounded in a labor theory points 
only to limited protection of individual use rights. 
For similar reasons, a third natural rights theory grounded in the public 
trust doctrine could fit groundwater, and it too would have implications 
rather different from those of a theory of individual first possession.
261
 The 
essence of the public trust doctrine is a principle that certain resources 
have an inherently communal character and therefore cannot be entirely 
reduced to individual ownership.
262
 Though courts have traditionally 
applied the public trust doctrine primarily to surface waterways and to 
wildlife,
263
 some of the basic justifications for applying the doctrine to 
 
 
 258. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 241, at 49–50 (arguing that this objection 
undermines labor theory in many contexts). 
 259. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text (noting that many aquifers cross property 
boundaries). 
 260. See generally BRYNER & PURCELL, supra note 109 (summarizing state permitting 
requirements). 
 261. That would not be true if the public were viewed as the first possessor. But advocates of a 
first possession-based theory have sometimes resisted recognition of such collective rights. See, e.g., 
Epstein, supra note 248, at 1238. But see Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 
411 (1987) (arguing that public ownership does have a place in property law). 
 262. See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970) (explaining the public trust doctrine and arguing 
for more extensive use of it); Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892). 
 263. See In re Water Use Permit Applications, 9 P.3d 409, 492–95 (Haw. 2000) (extending a 
public trust analysis to groundwater, and noting that “[it] is generally recognized that a simple private 
ownership model of property is conceptually incompatible with the actualities of natural 
watercourses”) (emphasis in original) (quoting Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287, 305–06 (Haw. 
1982)). The application of the public trust doctrine to groundwater is now directly at issue in litigation 
involving California’s Scott River. See Petition for Writ of Mandamus and Complaint for Declaratory 
and Injunctive Relief, Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., No. 34-2010-80000583 
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those resources fit equally well with groundwater. Like surface water and 
wildlife, groundwater crosses physical property boundaries, and its 
availability and value depend upon collective action.
264
 That suggests that 
a natural rights approach to groundwater should encompass collective, 
public rights, and these public rights should support, not limit, the ability 
of public entities to apply and occasionally redefine regulatory limits.
265
 
That outcome, though equally grounded in a conception of natural rights, 
is almost diametrically opposed to the limitations on regulation that 
libertarian-leaning natural rights theorists traditionally seek.
266
 
Consequently, a natural rights property theory favors more categorical 
treatment of groundwater rights only if we exclusively adopt one 
particular version of natural rights theory, in which first individual 
possession enjoys exalted status.
267
 And proponents of that approach have 
provided few compelling reasons why it should be adopted instead of its 
competitors.
268
 For Richard Epstein, for example, the strongest affirmative 
argument justifying that approach seems to be that the first possessor took 
some initiative and therefore “did something to distinguish himself from 
the common mass.”269 For others, the primary justification seems to be that 
John Locke espoused these ideas, and that Locke also heavily influenced 
the thinking of the United States’ Founders.270 But the former justification 
makes sense only if we assume that the common mass did not itself have 
property rights in the thing, or that those property rights were somehow 
inferior to those developed by the individual. A public trust approach 
provides a powerful and natural rights-based rebuttal to that assumption. 
And the latter reasoning is difficult to reconcile with the ample evidence 
that the Founders did not view takings law in such a strict libertarian 
way.
271
 
 
 
(Cal. Super. Ct., filed June 23, 2010) available at http://www.envirolaw.org/documents/WRIT 
PETITIONCOMPLAINT.pdf. 
 264. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text. 
 265. See ALEXANDER, supra note 176, at 141–46 (discussing German decisions employing this 
reasoning). 
 266. See supra notes 252–53 (describing conclusions that would follow from a typical libertarian 
conception of takings doctrine). 
 267. I am not arguing that these three variations of natural rights thinking are the only 
possibilities. Instead, my only point is that natural rights thinking does not lead to a particular 
outcome. 
 268. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 241, at 169–72 (describing the challenges of 
grounding a theory of regulatory takings in natural rights). 
 269. Epstein, supra note 248, at 1238. There are also utilitarian arguments favoring a rule of first 
possession, including the idea that such a rule will facilitate clear and stable rights. 
 270. See, e.g., Otterstedt, supra note 243, at 29–41. 
 271. See John F. Hart, Fish, Dams, and James Madison: Eighteenth-Century Species Protection 
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Despite these problems, libertarian-style natural rights theories still 
influence takings litigation, and groundwater litigation is no exception. To 
argue that one’s rights transcend political control and, potentially, any 
analysis of their societal utility, and instead exist because of an 
uncontestable natural law foundation, is a powerful rhetorical move. But 
the theoretical foundations for that move are shaky at best. Natural rights 
theory provides little basis for preventing governments from changing 
groundwater law or regulating individual owners’ groundwater use.  
B. Utilitarian Theories 
An alternative—and presently more popular, at least among 
academics—theory of property rights holds that protecting property makes 
sense because that protection increases social welfare.
272
 While natural 
rights theories lead in conflicting directions, these utilitarian theories 
consistently undermine arguments for categorical treatment of 
groundwater takings claims—albeit through a somewhat more 
complicated argument than one might initially expect. 
According to utilitarian theory, stable property rights encourage labor 
and long-term investment, promote social stability and participation, and 
generally provide the foundational conditions for a functional economy 
and political order.
273
 Similarly, according to some utilitarians, a 
compensation requirement can improve efficiency by compelling 
government regulators to internalize the costs of the constraints they 
impose.
274
 Consequently, several strands of utilitarian theory support 
takings protection for individual property rights.
275
 However, utilitarian 
 
 
and the Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, 63 MD. L. REV. 287 (2004) (arguing that the 
Founders were familiar and comfortable with water-use regulations); William Michael Treanor, The 
Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782 
(1995). See also ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 241, at 35–56 (arguing that Locke’s thinking 
was actually at odds with some modern libertarian views). 
 272. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 50 (7th ed. 2010) (“Utilitarian theory is, without 
doubt, the dominant view of property today, at least among lawyers.”); ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, 
supra note 241, at 11–14 (summarizing basic elements of utilitarian theory). 
 273. See Rose, supra note 189, at 2 (summarizing these arguments); Frank I. Michelman, 
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 
80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1211–12 (1967). For an explanation of ways these dynamics can support 
environmental protection, see J. Peter Byrne, Property and Environment: Thoughts on an Evolving 
Relationship, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 679, 679–80 (2005). 
 274. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Commentary, Deterrence and Distribution in the 
Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999). For a counterargument that government is not 
really sensitive to these incentives, see Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, 
and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (2000). 
 275. For an overview of utilitarian property theory, see generally ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, 
supra note 241, at 11–34. 
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theory does not support absolute protection of those property rights, for 
absolute protection might reify patterns of ownership that promote 
inefficient externalities or are otherwise inimical to innovation, progress, 
and economic growth.
276
 Similarly, overly strong takings protection might 
create a moral hazard problem, for property owners, realizing that any 
regulatory limitation will result in compensation, will have incentives to 
use property in ways that are dangerous or inefficient.
277
 Utilitarian theory 
therefore directly supports the core compromise of modern takings 
doctrine, for it suggests that the doctrine should balance the promotion of 
stable property rights against the need to allow some social evolution and 
change.
278
 
That compromise appears equally appropriate with groundwater. On 
the one hand, the classic utilitarian arguments in favor of protecting 
property rights appear to apply. Groundwater use has significant social 
benefits, but realizing those benefits often requires sustained investment. 
An orchard is not worth growing, and a municipal water supply system is 
not worth building, if legal access to the water supply is likely to 
disappear. Consequently, stable property rights may provide a level of 
assurance that makes those sustained investments possible.
279
 On the other 
hand, utilitarian theories also clearly support some governmental capacity 
for regulatory oversight and legal change. Initially, some legal intervention 
may be necessary to maximize the value of groundwater rights.
280
 Absent 
regulation, individual users have little protection against other competing 
users, and the natural consequence is likely to be a classic tragedy of the 
 
 
 276. See, e.g., Sax, supra note 229, at 1449 (“The noncompensation norm in circumstances of 
social change reflects a decision to encourage adaptive behavior by rewarding individuals who most 
adroitly adjust in the face of change.”). 
 277. See Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 99 
Q.J. ECON. 71, 90–91 (1984). 
 278. How that balance should be struck is, of course, a subject of great debate among utilitarians. 
See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 241, at 161 (“[T]here is far less utilitarian consensus about 
whether (if ever) the government should compensate property owners when it merely regulates the use 
to which they may put their property.”). 
 279. While this argument is intuitive, the willingness of groundwater users to make long-term 
investments even where the governing legal regime provides little protection suggests that other 
human characteristics—including, perhaps, an inherent excess of optimism—may sustain investment 
even where the law provides little protection. See generally Thompson, supra note 6, at 255–65 
(exploring why people seem to overinvest in resources with uncertain availability). 
 280. See Terry L. Anderson & Pamela S. Snyder, Georgia’s Groundwater: Own it or Lose it, 
SAVANNAH MORNING NEWS, May 19, 1996, available at http://www.perc.org/articles/article169.php 
(advocating a government role in defining groundwater rights); see generally Harold Demsetz, Toward 
a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967) (explaining how property rights often 
require delineation to hold value). 
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commons.
281
 Similarly, legal intervention can prevent inefficient 
externalities, like rivers pumped dry to sustain the watering of suburban 
lawns.
282
 For these reasons, courts have readily acknowledged a powerful 
utilitarian argument in favor of moving—without paying compensation—
toward increased regulation of groundwater use.
283
 
Of course, the primary test of a utilitarian argument need not be the 
intuitions of lawyers, for utilitarian arguments lend themselves to 
economic analysis.
284
 And while the utilitarian arguments in favor of 
groundwater regulation have seemed obvious to jurists, the work of 
resource economists adds a surprising twist to the inquiry. In a series of 
studies, economists have compared the economic value generated by 
aquifers under regulated and non-regulated regimes.
285
 In contravention of 
conventional wisdom and judicial rhetoric, they have found that the 
positive benefit of regulation is small and sometimes non-existent.
286
  
There are several reasons why this “Gisser-Sánchez effect” might 
exist.
287
 First, and most importantly, pumping happens sooner in an 
unregulated regime, and a regulated regime therefore produces delayed 
financial returns. According to standard economic theory, those delayed 
returns should be discounted; economists generally assume that capital 
produced earlier can be reinvested and can earn a positive return.
288
 And a 
ten percent discount rate—which some of the key studies did actually 
use—can offset many of the economic benefits of sustainable pumping 
patterns.
289
 Additionally, economists have generally found that as 
groundwater availability drops, agricultural users will shift to higher-value 
 
 
 281. See Thompson, supra note 6, at 250. 
 282. See GLENNON, supra note 15, at 99–111 (describing overuse of groundwater in 
Massachusetts’ Ipswich River watershed). 
 283. See Sw. Eng’g Co. v. Ernst, 291 P.2d 764, 768 (Ariz. 1955) (“The legislative finding that the 
exhaustion of ground water by excessive withdrawals threatens to destroy one of the principal 
economic resources of the state to the consequential serious injury of all is not disputed. Such a 
conclusion is obviously justified . . . .”) (footnote omitted).  
 284. There also are factors relevant to a utilitarian analysis that economic analysis cannot easily 
qualify. 
 285. See Phoebe Koundouri, Current Issues in the Economics of Groundwater Resource 
Management, 18 J. ECON. SURVS. 703, 706–16 (2004) (summarizing multiple studies). 
 286. Id. 
 287. The name derives from Micha Gisser & David A. Sánchez, Competition Versus Optimal 
Control in Groundwater Pumping, 16 WATER RESOURCES RES. 638 (1980). 
 288. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 511 (8th ed. 2011) 
(discussing the use of discount rates in cost-benefit policy analyses). 
 289. See Koundouri, supra note 285, at 715 (documenting the sensitivity of the Gisser-Sánchez 
effect to discount rates). 
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crops, typically mitigating some of the economic impact of shortage.
290
 
These studies suggest that the utilitarian arguments in favor of 
groundwater regulation, and, accordingly, in favor of traditional takings 
doctrine, are weaker than courts have traditionally assumed. 
Nevertheless, the courts’ traditional assumptions still are probably 
right, though the analysis is a little bit more complex than those courts 
have acknowledged. The studies documenting the Gisser-Sánchez effect 
generally assumed the existence of a relatively homogenous set of 
groundwater users.
291
 In many water conflicts, however, the earliest users 
also are the lowest value users, for agricultural users often predate urban 
competitors who put water to higher-value uses.
292
 For that reason, a 
system that protects water availability for those urban users (or that 
provides agricultural users with stable and protected rights that may be 
sold to urban users) will often produce higher values. Second, the 
economists’ discount rates may be unrealistic.293 A ten percent return on 
investment may make sense in a developing economy, where early profits 
can be reinvested in capital that will allow huge improvements in farming 
practices.
294
 In a mature agricultural economy, however, that rate of return 
seems quite optimistic.
295
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the older 
studies finding the Gisser-Sánchez effect attributed no value to 
environmental protection.
296
 But environmental protection does have 
economic value, which groundwater pumping often compromises.
297
 In the 
 
 
 290. See Giordano, supra note 59, at 171 (“[G]roundwater users have consistently been shown to 
adapt to changing resource conditions by reducing pumping, adopting water-saving technologies, and 
changing cropping patterns . . . .”). 
 291. See Koundouri, supra note 285, at 716 (noting that groundwater management may be more 
welfare-enhancing in areas with “heterogeneous land productivity”). 
 292. See Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1873, 
1887–88 (2005) (describing value disparity between agricultural water use and use by the 
semiconductor industry). Because of different crop prices and water demands, disparities of value also 
can exist among agricultural users. 
 293. For a broad critique of the use of discount rates in policy analysis, see Douglas A. Kysar, 
Discounting . . . on Stilts, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 119 (2007). 
 294. M.R. Llamas & P. Martínez-Santos, Editorial, Intensive Groundwater Use: Silent Revolution 
and Potential Source of Social Conflicts, 131 J. WATER RESOURCE PLAN. & MGMT. 337, 338 (2005) 
(describing how heavy groundwater use can facilitate capital reinvestment and economic growth). 
 295. See John J. Boland et al., The Theory and Practice of Benefit-Cost Analysis, in THE 
EVOLUTION OF WATER RESOURCE PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING 82 (Clifford S. Russell & 
Duane D. Baumann eds., 2009) (discussing the debate over appropriate discount rates; most 
recommendations are well below ten percent). 
 296. Encarna Esteban & José Albiac, Groundwater and Ecosystems Damages: Questioning the 
Gisser-Sánchez Effect, 70 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2062, 2064 (2011) (noting that earlier studies focused 
only on whether farmers’ welfare would be enhanced). 
 297. See generally GLENNON, supra note 15 (providing examples of the negative environmental 
effects of groundwater use); COMM. ON ASSESSING AND THE SERVS. OF AQUATIC AND RELATED 
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absence of regulatory restraints, individual pumpers have little incentive to 
preserve recharge into downstream surface waterways, even if society as a 
whole would derive great value from environmental protection.
298
 The 
adverse environmental consequences of groundwater use therefore are a 
classic externality, and more recent studies that attempt to account for that 
externality have reached very different results.
299
 
These utilitarian arguments do not argue for unfettered regulatory 
control. As many commentators have pointed out, some legal stability may 
be a necessary precondition to investment and sustained labor. But a 
utilitarian property theory clearly provides no compelling argument for 
freezing groundwater rights in their present and largely pre-regulatory 
state, for treating restrictions on individual users as potential categorical 
takings, or for carving out any other special set of takings laws that 
provide heightened protection to groundwater use rights. Instead, with 
groundwater, the existence of regulation and the potential for regulatory 
change both are necessary preconditions for social and economic value. 
C. Theories of Personal and Societal Flourishing 
A third set of property theories holds that we should define and protect 
property rights in ways that promote human flourishing. Holding property, 
according to Margaret Radin’s famous theory, helps humans live 
personally fulfilling lives.
300
 Similarly, as theorists dating back to Aristotle 
have pointed out, participation in a functioning polity also promotes 
human flourishing, and property ownership can encourage such 
participation.
301
 If these premises are accurate, then protection against 
takings will sometimes be an important precursor to personal fulfillment. 
But these theories also imply some limitations upon property rights. 
According to Radin’s personhood theory, some property rights are more 
connected to personal fulfillment than others—for example, a wedding 
ring or a home may be more personally important than an absentee-owned 
investment property—and takings doctrine need not provide so much 
protection to the latter type of right as it does to the former.
302
 Human 
 
 
TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, VALUING ECOSYSTEM SERVS.: TOWARD 
BETTER ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION-MAKING (2005). 
 298. See Esteban & Albiac, supra note 296, at 2064 (noting that these costs are externalized by 
farmers). 
 299. Id. (“[U]nder regulation, social welfare improves substantially over free market outcomes 
when ecosystem damages from depletion are important.”). 
 300. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 957 (1982). 
 301. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 241, at 80–101.  
 302. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 153–56 (1993). 
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flourishing theories suggest two additional bases for limiting property 
rights. First, because property rights exist through the consent of a 
community, that community should have the authority to attach 
responsibilities to property ownership and to ask owners to draw upon 
their property to support the common good.
303
 Additionally, social and 
political participation will be less fruitful and fulfilling if the polity lacks 
any ability to consider, and revise, property rights, for the political realm 
then would be completely subordinated to the present structure of property 
law, even if that structure is inequitable or unwise.
304
 These theories of 
personal and societal flourishing therefore necessitate a closer inquiry into 
the ways a particular type of property right relates to human fulfillment. 
For groundwater rights, that inquiry leads to some interesting 
conclusions. The first is that groundwater rights on their own will rarely 
merit special protection.
305
 Second, to the extent groundwater rights are 
closely linked to human flourishing, and therefore might merit heightened 
protection, those links are likely to be inextricably tied to the use of 
groundwater on land. That relationship in turn undermines any argument 
for takings doctrine protecting individual groundwater rights to any greater 
extent than it protects rights in land.
306
 And third, there are powerful 
arguments in favor of a strong societal voice in decisions about 
groundwater use.
307
 
The reasons why groundwater rarely will qualify as “personhood 
property” should be fairly obvious. Simply put, very few people have an 
emotional connection to groundwater. An aquifer is quite different from a 
wedding ring.
308
 It is even different from a surface waterway or spring. 
People can and often do form profound personal connections to surface 
waterways.
309
 But (with rare exceptions
310
) none of the activities that 
 
 
 303. See ALEXANDER & PEÑALVER, supra note 241, at 180–82; Eric T. Freyfogle, Taking 
Property Seriously, in PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SUSTAINABILITY: THE EVOLUTION OF PROPERTY 
RIGHTS TO MEET ECOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 43, 55 (David Grinlinton & Prue Taylor eds., 2011). 
 304. See Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism, Norms, 105 YALE L.J. 1121, 1149–50 (1996) 
(reviewing WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS (1995)). 
 305. See infra notes 308–09 and accompanying text. 
 306. See infra notes 313–15 and accompanying text. 
 307. See infra text accompanying notes 316–30. 
 308. See Radin, supra note 300, at 959 (listing examples of property that would hold special 
personhood status). 
 309. See, e.g., NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT 161 (1976) (“I am haunted by 
waters.”). While MacLean’s story evinces the profound connections that people feel to waterways, the 
fact that the waterways he loved were not private also raises questions about the reach of Radin’s 
theory. Clearly people can form powerful connections to water and land—connections that are central 
to their identity—without holding any individual ownership interest. 
 310. See David Owen, Notes from the Underground: Florida’s Sinkhole Peril, THE NEW YORKER, 
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emotionally attach us to rivers and streams are possible with groundwater, 
which we cannot swim in, fish in, travel upon, or even see.
311
 For most 
people, groundwater is an economic resource or a means of sustenance, 
and beyond that we give it very little thought.
312
 
Of course, when we put groundwater to use, the nature of that 
relationship changes. Many farmers’ sense of self is defined by working 
their land, and working the land may not be possible without groundwater 
access.
313
 Similarly, a rural home or a beloved cottage may be 
uninhabitable without a functioning well.
314
 Groundwater and personhood, 
in short, can be closely connected. But in all of these circumstances, it is 
the mixture of groundwater use rights with land use rights that creates the 
value.
315
 And it makes little sense for groundwater rights to have greater 
status under takings doctrine than the very land use rights from which 
groundwater derivatively takes its “personhood” value. Even if we accept 
all the premises of personhood theory, groundwater apart from land should 
have lesser, not more exalted, status than land in takings law. 
Theories focused on the relationship between societal health and 
human flourishing provide even stronger arguments against heightened 
takings protection of groundwater rights. To put the point simply, 
groundwater use regulation can play a central role in helping a society 
thrive. In part, regulation can play that role by reducing conflict, for in the 
absence of regulatory control landowners would need some other means 
for resolving disputes over groundwater use.
316
 They might succeed.
317
 But 
 
 
Mar. 18, 2013, at 36, 38–40 (describing divers who explore Florida’s subterranean caves). 
 311. This statement applies to groundwater as a hydrologist would define it. In some states—
Texas is an example—water can retain its legal classification as groundwater long after it leaves the 
ground.  
 312. See supra notes 2–8 and accompanying text. 
 313. See WENDELL BERRY, BRINGING IT TO THE TABLE: ON FARMING AND FOOD 74–75 (2009) 
(“Why do farmers farm, given their economic adversities on top of the many frustrations and 
difficulties normal to farming? And always the answer is: ‘Love. They must do it for love.’ Farmers 
farm for the love of farming.”); JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 50 (Robert J. DeMott ed., 
Penguin Books 1992) (1939) (“If he owns property only so he can walk on it and handle it and be sad 
when it isn’t doing well, and feel fine when the rain falls on it, that property is him, and some way he’s 
bigger because he owns it.”); supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text (describing groundwater’s 
importance to agriculture). 
 314. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing the extent to which rural America 
depends upon groundwater). 
 315. In fact, it really is the mixture of groundwater use rights with land use rights and personal 
property that allows this personal connection, for working the land requires tools and material as well 
as land and water. See Peñalver, supra note 192, at 261 (pointing out the necessity of personal property 
to realize the value of land). 
 316. See supra notes 9–15 and accompanying text (noting the frequency of groundwater use 
conflicts). 
 317. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991) (exploring the ability of property owners to resolve disputes without regulatory 
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where many users share the resource and individual activities are difficult 
to monitor, ample research suggests they will usually fail.
318
 Moreover, if 
it can establish sustainable pumping regimes, regulation can help ensure 
that water remains present to support future farms, residents, and 
businesses. Without such intervention, communities—and, in extreme 
circumstances, countries—may be difficult to sustain.319 
Regulatory intervention also can facilitate social stability in ways that 
transcend economics. As Carol Rose has pointed out, collective property 
interests sometimes can facilitate interactions that help communities 
thrive.
320
 Water resources exemplify that potential. By providing access to 
shared resources like fish and wildlife, means of navigation, places of 
gathering, and sometimes, opportunities for solitude and escape, 
waterways can play a central role in supporting human communities. 
Consequently, many commentators have argued that water resources have 
a uniquely public dimension, which traditionally has formed the basis for 
legal restrictions on the extent of private exploitation.
321
 Groundwater 
directly performs few of these functions, of course; no one goes to the 
aquifer to seek companionship or solace. But aquifers play a crucial role in 
sustaining the surface waterways that do perform these functions.
322
 If, in 
Justice Holmes’ often-quoted words, “[a] river is more than an amenity, it 
is a treasure,” then groundwater quite often is the goose that lays the 
golden eggs.
323
 
 
 
intervention). 
 318. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text (explaining why groundwater resources are 
particularly ill-suited to non-legal management). 
 319. See Thomas L. Friedman, Without Water, Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2013, at SR1 
(explaining how drought and groundwater overpumping exacerbated Syria’s descent into war); 
Thomas L. Friedman, Postcard from Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2013, at A27 (quoting Abdul 
Rahman al-Eryani, Yemen’s former minister of water and environment: “[W]herever in Yemen you 
see aquifers depleting, you have the worst conflicts.”). Other stark examples of this phenomenon—
though without warfare—come from India, where groundwater depletion presents even greater 
challenges than it does in the United States. See Anantha K.H. & K.V. Raju, Groundwater Depletion 
and Coping Strategies of Farming Communities in Hard Rock Areas of Southern Peninsular India, 
ASIA-PAC. DEV. J., Dec. 2010, at 119, 130, 139–40 (2010) (describing economic dislocation and 
human migration, and stating that “[t]he sustainability of communities in rural areas [is] in doubt if the 
conditions mentioned above persist for an extended period of time”). 
 320. See Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public 
Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986). 
 321. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Proceedings of the 2001 Symposium on Managing Hawai’i’s Public 
Trust Doctrine, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 21, 24–25 (2001). 
 322. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 7 (describing interconnections between surface water and 
groundwater). 
 323. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931). 
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Many places illustrate that value, and some of the best examples lie at 
the downgradient fringes of the Edwards Aquifer. There, the aquifer feeds 
many springs, and those springs in turn sustain rivers that flow to the Gulf 
of Mexico.
324
 To say that the springs have helped define communities is an 
understatement. Archaeological evidence suggests that humans have lived 
by the San Marcos Springs, one of the most significant discharge points, 
for more than 10,000 years.
325
 In modern times, they have become a tourist 
mecca. For years, kitschy underwater performances, complete with 
dancing humans and swimming pigs, drew huge crowds.
326
 More recently, 
the pigs have been displaced by more ecologically sensitive forms of 
sightseeing.
327
 The downstream rivers are of equal recreational value, with 
large crowds of people floating downstream on typical summer days.
328
 
Threatened or endangered species depend upon the aquifer’s outflows, 
both in the springs themselves and miles downstream, where the rivers 
sustain some of North America’s most important whooping crane 
habitat.
329
 But the springs are under threat. Declining water levels in the 
springs were one of the key triggers for the litigation and political 
controversies that ultimately led to the creation of the Edwards Aquifer 
Authority, and, thus, to Texas’s recent spate of groundwater/takings 
litigation.
330
 And if that litigation undermines groundwater use regulation, 
the threat will likely emerge again. 
CONCLUSION 
The coming years probably will bring increased conflict over 
groundwater. Scientists expect that climate change will exacerbate stresses 
on surface water supplies, leading water users of all types to seek 
 
 
 324. See Votteler, supra note 38, at 261; Edwards Aquifer and the Guadalupe River, GUADALUPE-
BLANCO RIVER AUTHORITY, http://www.gbra.org/drought/edwardsaquifer.aspx (last visited Dec. 23, 
2013). 
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alternative water sources.
331
 Development will continue, creating new 
demand. And while agricultural demand may remain steady or even 
decline, conflicts between agricultural use of water and environmental 
protection of aquatic resources show no signs of abating. The underlying 
tensions that generated takings litigation in Texas and in many other states 
are with us to stay. 
One possible response to those challenges is to use constitutional 
takings clauses to provide existing groundwater users with greater 
protection against regulatory limitation. Already, in courtrooms across the 
country, litigants are arguing for that change.
332
 It would be a mistake. 
Such heightened protection would mark a break from historic practices, 
and it lacks any supporting judicial precedent.
333
 It also lacks any 
compelling justification in the theories that undergird our property law.
334
 
That does not mean that takings protection for groundwater rights is 
inappropriate. With both land and water, the United States has a long 
history of balancing constitutionalized property rights with regulatory 
authority, and that balancing act can continue even if courts declare 
groundwater rights to be constitutional property. But groundwater should 
enjoy no greater level of takings protection than any other form of 
property right. 
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